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Abstract	  
We	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  health	  benefits	  on	  labor	  mobility	  and	  wages	  in	  a	  developing	  country.	  Seguro	  
Popular	  provides	  health	  services	  to	  the	  uninsured	  in	  Mexico.	  Using	  the	  gradual	  roll-­‐out	  of	  the	  system	  at	  
the	  municipality	  level,	  we	  estimate	  that	  Seguro	  Popular	  did	  not	  increase	  overall	  informality,	  and	  did	  not	  
affect	  wage	  gains	  for	  workers	  who	  switch	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  the	  informal	  sector.	  Thus,	  extending	  
health	   benefits	   to	   uncovered	  workers	   does	   not	   significantly	   increase	   labor	   supply	   distortions.	   To	   the	  
extent	  that	  marginal	  workers	  do	  not	  value	  health	  insurance,	  financing	  health	  insurance	  through	  payroll	  
taxes	  may	  increase	  informality.	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Introduction	  
When	  health	  benefits	  are	  tied	  to	  jobs,	  they	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  distort	  labor	  supply.	  Workers	  may	  fail	  
to	  take	  jobs	  where	  they	  are	  more	  productive	  and	  earn	  higher	  wages	  because	  those	  jobs	  do	  not	  provide	  
health	  insurance.	  One	  incarnation	  of	  this	  labor	  market	  distortion	  is	  “job	  lock”,	  whereby	  workers	  in	  a	  job	  
with	  health	  insurance	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  leave	  that	  job.	  Another	  incarnation	  of	  this	  same	  problem	  is	  that	  
workers	  may	  avoid	  becoming	  self-­‐employed	  because	  they	  would	  have	  to	  buy	  their	  own	  health	  insurance	  
at	  a	  higher	  cost	  than	  group	  insurance.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  both	  phenomena	  is	  mixed	  (Gruber	  and	  
Madrian,	   2002,	   Gumus	   and	   Regan,	   2009,	   Heim	   and	   Lurie,	   2010).	   Similarly,	   while	   the	   theory	   of	  
compensating	   wage	   differentials	   predicts	   that	   jobs	   with	   health	   insurance	   pay	   lower	   wages,	   existing	  
studies	   do	  not	   provide	   strong	  evidence	   for	   a	   health	   insurance	   compensating	  wage	  differential	   (Pauly,	  
2001,	  Lehrer	  and	  Pereira,	  2007).	  	  
This	  paper	  analyzes	  the	  impact	  of	  health	  benefits	  on	  labor	  mobility	  and	  wages	  in	  a	  developing	  country,	  
Mexico.	   As	   in	   many	  middle	   income	   countries,	   health	   insurance	   in	  Mexico	   used	   to	   be	   tied	   to	   payroll	  
contributions.	  More	   than	   half	   of	  Mexican	  workers	  went	   uncovered	   because	   they	  worked	   in	   informal	  
jobs	   (Perry	  et	  al.,	   2007),	   i.e.	   jobs	   that	  do	  not	  pay	   social	   security	   contributions.	   To	  address	   this	   lack	  of	  
coverage,	  Mexico	   introduced	   a	   new	   health	   benefit	   system,	   Seguro	   Popular	   (SP),	   starting	   in	   2002.	   SP	  
covers	   all	   individuals	   that	   are	  not	   affiliated	  with	   the	   formal	  health	   insurance	   system	  based	  on	  payroll	  
contributions,	   and	   it	   is	   in	   practice	   free	   to	   the	   overwhelming	   majority	   of	   workers.	   SP	   was	   rolled	   out	  
progressively	  at	  the	  municipality	  level,	  and	  the	  government	  predicts	  the	  program	  will	  reach	  full	  coverage	  
of	   the	  Mexican	   population	   in	   2011.	   By	   increasing	   the	   benefits	   of	   working	   informally,	   SP	   incentivizes	  
workers	   to	   remain	   or	   become	   informal.	   An	   increase	   in	   informality	   generates	   two	   key	   issues.	   First,	   by	  
working	   informally,	   workers	   are	   deprived	   of	   formal	   benefits	   other	   than	   health	   insurance,	   such	   as	  
retirement	   pensions.	   Second,	   the	   cost	   of	   SP	   will	   be	   higher	   if	   informality	   increases,	   as	   the	   additional	  
informal	  workers	  become	  eligible	  for	  SP.	  In	  the	  US	  context,	  this	  issue	  has	  been	  analyzed	  under	  the	  name	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of	   crowd	   out,	   the	   idea	   being	   that	   workers	   who	   would	   have	   paid	   for	   private	   health	   insurance	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  the	  public	  scheme	  prefer	  to	  take	  up	  the	  public	  scheme	  when	  the	   latter	  becomes	  available.	  
There	   has	   been	   much	   debate	   about	   whether	   public	   health	   insurance	   crowds	   out	   private	   health	  
insurance	   in	   the	   US,	   but	   some	   of	   the	   most	   recent	   work	   indicates	   that	   crowd	   out	   is	   an	   important	  
phenomenon	  (Gruber	  and	  Simon	  2008).	  Extrapolating	  from	  the	  US	  context,	  we	  may	  expect	  informality	  in	  
Mexico	  to	  increase	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  SP2,	  causing	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  public	  health	  scheme	  to	  become	  
much	  greater	  than	  anticipated.	  Additional	  taxes	  may	  need	  to	  be	  levied	  on	  the	  formal	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  
finance	  the	  program,	  leading	  to	  further	  distortions.	  This	  paper	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  severity	  of	  these	  issues	  
by	  examining	  the	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  informality.	  
We	  first	  show	  that	  the	  level	  of	  informality	  in	  a	  municipality	  prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  
does	   not	   determine	   when	   Seguro	   Popular	   is	   eventually	   introduced.	   We	   then	   analyze	   the	   impact	   of	  
Seguro	   Popular	   on	   informality	   using	   panel	   regression.	   Seguro	   Popular	   does	   not	   significantly	   increase	  
informality,	   and	   this	   result	   is	   robust	   to	   several	   definitions	   of	   informality.	   When	   using	   our	   preferred	  
definition	  of	   informality,	   i.e.	  having	  no	  formal	  health	   insurance	  or	  being	  self-­‐employed,	  the	   increase	   is	  
on	  the	  order	  of	  1	  percentage	  point	  and	  is	  not	  significant	  over	  the	  whole	  employed	  population.	  However,	  
if	  we	  restrict	  the	  sample	  to	  workers	  with	  less	  than	  nine	  years	  of	  schooling,	  we	  find	  that	  Seguro	  Popular	  
was	   associated	   with	   a	   significant	   0.9	   percentage	   point	   increase	   in	   informality	   (60%	   of	   workers	   are	  
informal	   in	  this	  group).	  Slightly	   larger	  significant	   increases	   in	   informality	  are	  found	  when	  the	  sample	   is	  
further	  restricted	  to	  married	  workers	  with	  children,	  or	  to	  workers	  over	  34	  years	  old.	  The	  heterogeneity	  
in	  the	  impact	   is	   likely	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  workers	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  
health	  insurance	  when	  deciding	  to	  work	  formally	  or	  informally.	  Additionally,	  the	  small	  size	  of	  the	  effect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There is one important difference between the US and Mexican context that lowers the expected amount of crowd 
out generated by SP in Mexico. Indeed, in the US, it is generally legal for an individual or firm to drop private health 
insurance. By contrast, in Mexico, health insurance contributions are mandatory. In order to drop coverage, a firm 
has to become entirely informal, which can have large costs in terms of fines and lack of access to formal credit 
markets. It would be easier for individual workers to move to informal jobs, but that is still more costly than staying 
in the same job and just dropping health insurance, an option typically open to American workers.  
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suggests	   that	   marginal	   workers	   do	   not	   choose	   between	   formal	   and	   informal	   jobs	   based	   on	   the	  
availability	  of	  health	  insurance.	  If	  workers	  who	  move	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  the	  informal	  sector	  value	  
health	   insurance	   benefits,	   one	   would	   expect,	   all	   other	   things	   equal,	   to	   see	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   wage	  
differential	   between	   the	   formal	   and	   the	   informal	   sector	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   SP.	  We	   analyze	   the	  
impact	  of	  SP	  on	  wage	  gains	   for	  workers	  moving	   from	  the	   formal	   to	   the	   informal	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	   for	  
movers	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  We	  find	  no	  significant	  effect	  of	  SP	  on	  wage	  gains	  for	  either	  direction	  of	  
the	  move.	   The	   absence	  of	   an	   effect	   on	  wages	   is	   consistent	  with	  marginal	  workers	   placing	   little	   to	   no	  
value	  on	  health	  benefits3.	  Finally,	  since	  Oportunidades	  was	   introduced	  in	  urban	  areas	  during	  the	  same	  
period	   as	   Seguro	   Popular,	   we	   examine	   both	   programs	   together.	   Oportunidades	   is	   a	   means-­‐tested	  
conditional	  cash	  transfer.	  As	  such,	  the	  program	  may	  incentivize	  workers	  to	  work	  informally	  in	  order	  to	  
conceal	   income	   more	   easily	   and	   pass	   the	   means	   test.	   We	   find	   that	   Oportunidades	   did	   not	   have	   a	  
significant	  impact	  on	  informality,	  and	  controlling	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  Oportunidades	  does	  not	  affect	  
the	  results	  for	  SP.	  
These	  findings	  should	  be	  reassuring	  to	  policy	  makers:	  Seguro	  Popular	  offers	  workers	  protection	  against	  
catastrophic	  health	  expenditures	  with	  minimal	  distortion	  of	   labor	   supply	  decisions.	   These	   results	   thus	  
make	   it	   more	   likely	   that	   Seguro	   Popular	   is	   welfare	   improving.	   However,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   marginal	  
workers	   do	   seem	   to	   value	   health	   benefits,	   health	   insurance	   financing	   through	   payroll	   taxation	   may	  
create	   labor	   market	   distortions.	   If	   marginal	   workers	   do	   not	   value	   health	   insurance,	   making	   payroll	  
contributions	   for	  health	  mandatory	  may	   result	   in	   these	  marginal	  workers	   choosing	   to	  work	   informally	  
rather	  than	  pay	  for	  a	  benefit	  that	  they	  do	  not	  value.	  
This	  paper	  makes	  three	  key	  contributions	  to	  the	  existing	  literature.	  Our	  first	  contribution	  relates	  to	  the	  
impact	  of	  health	   insurance	  on	   labor	  mobility	  and	  wages.	  The	  US	   literature	  has	   found	  mixed	  results	  on	  
both	   of	   these	   outcomes,	  with	   papers	   identified	   off	   policy	   experiments	   generally	   finding	   results	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 We also examine alternative explanations for the absence of an impact on wages below. 
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supportive	  of	  a	  negative	  impact	  of	  health	  insurance	  on	  labor	  mobility	  (Gruber	  and	  Madrian,	  1994)	  and	  
wages	  (Gruber,	  1994).	  Using	  a	  policy	  experiment	  which	  entails	  a	  change	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  health	  insurance	  
that	   is	   arguably	   much	   larger	   than	   the	   changes	   used	   in	   US	   studies,	   we	   do	   not	   find	   evidence	   that	  
extending	  health	  insurance	  coverage	  increases	  job	  mobility	  or	  reduces	  wages	  of	  covered	  workers	  in	  the	  
Mexican	  labor	  market.	  Our	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  reverse	  job	  lock	  phenomenon:	  workers	  in	  jobs	  
without	  health	  insurance	  are	  unwilling	  to	  take	  jobs	  with	  health	  insurance	  because	  the	  cost	  of	  insurance	  
is	  higher	  than	  its	  perceived	  benefits.	  Finally,	  our	  results	  also	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  no	  crowd	  out	  generated	  
by	  SP	  in	  Mexico.	  Our	  second	  contribution	  is	  to	  the	  specific	  debate	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  
informality	   (Levy,	  2008).	  Working	  papers	   looking	  at	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	   introduction	  of	  SP	  (Campos-­‐
Vasquez	  and	  Knox,	  2008,	  and	  Barros,	  2009)	  failed	  to	  find	  any	  significant	  effect	  of	  the	  program.	  Our	  time	  
frame	   allows	   us	   to	   look	   at	   long-­‐run	   impacts	   and	   we	   show	   that,	   while	   there	   is	   indeed	   a	   significant	  
increase	   in	   informality	   for	   less	  educated	  workers,	   the	  effect	   is	   small	  and	  does	  not	   increase	  over	   time.	  
Additionally,	  our	  data	  on	  the	  wages	  of	  workers	  who	  switch	  between	  formal	  and	  informal	  jobs	  allows	  us	  
to	  understand	  why	  the	  effect	  of	  SP	  on	  informality	  is	  so	  limited.	  Our	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  workers	  
who	  are	  close	  to	  indifferent	  between	  working	  formally	  and	  informally	  placing	  little	  to	  no	  value	  on	  health	  
benefits.	  A	  very	  recent	  working	  paper	  by	  Bosch	  and	  Campos-­‐Vazquez	  (2010)	  uses	  administrative	  data	  to	  
look	   at	   the	   long-­‐run	   impact	   of	   SP	   on	   formal	   employment.	   They	   also	   find	   a	   limited	   decline	   in	   formal	  
employment,	  but	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  data	  on	  individuals	  working	  in	  the	  informal	  sector,	  they	  are	  
unable	   to	   further	   analyze	   the	   impact	   of	   SP	   on	   wages.	   The	   third	   key	   contribution	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	  
examine	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  urban	  expansion	  of	  Oportunidades	  on	  informality.	  We	  find	  
that	  Oportunidades	  had	  no	  significant	  impact	  on	  informality.	  
The	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  First	  we	  provide	  some	  institutional	  background	  on	  
Seguro	   Popular	   and	   Oportunidades	   and	   discuss	   their	   potential	   impact	   on	   informality.	   Second,	   we	  
present	   the	  data.	  We	  then	  examine	   the	   results	   in	   four	  stages.	  We	  start	  with	  establishing	  whether	   the	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timing	   of	   the	   introduction	   of	   Seguro	   Popular	   was	   related	   to	   informality	   and	   other	   characteristics	   of	  
municipalities.	   Second,	   we	   analyze	   the	   impact	   of	   Seguro	   Popular	   on	   workers’	   propensity	   to	   hold	  
informal	  jobs.	  Third,	  we	  look	  at	  whether	  Seguro	  Popular	  affects	  transitions	  between	  formal	  and	  informal	  
jobs.	  Fourth,	  we	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  wage	  changes	  for	  workers	  
who	  move	  between	  formal	  and	  informal	  jobs.	  	  Finally,	  we	  conclude.	  
The	   Mexican	   Social	   Protection	   System	   and	   Informality:	   Institutional	  
Background	  and	  Theoretical	  Framework	  
Seguro Popular 
Before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular,	  access	  to	  health	  institutions	  in	  Mexico	  was	  primarily	  linked	  to	  
formal	  employment	  and	  covered	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  payroll	  taxes	  supported	  by	  employees	  and	  employers.	  
Two	  institutions	  were	  the	  main	  providers	  of	  services	  to	  workers	  affiliated	  via	  their	  employers,	  Instituto	  
Mexicano	  del	  Seguro	  Social	  (IMSS)	  and	  Instituto	  de	  Seguridad	  y	  Servicios	  Sociales	  de	  los	  Trabajadores	  del	  
Estado	   (ISSSTE).	   Individuals	   without	   formal	   employment	   had	   access	   only	   to	   services	   provided	   by	   the	  
Ministry	   of	   Health	   (SS)	   or	   private	   medical	   services;	   these	   individuals	   represent	   half	   of	   the	   total	  
population	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  services	  provided	  by	  the	  SS	  did	  not	  ensure	  access	  to	  a	  package	  of	  services	  
and	  medical	  procedures	  and	  user	  fees	  were	  required	  for	  medications	  and	  some	  medical	  services.	  Thus,	  
in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  health	  shock,	  uninsured	  individuals	  could	  face	  catastrophic	  health	  costs	  or	  chose	  not	  to	  
seek	  medical	  attention	  at	  all.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  address	  this	  situation,	  in	  2002	  the	  Mexican	  federal	  government	  introduced	  a	  pilot	  program	  
called	  “Programa	  de	  Salud	  para	  Todos,”	  known	  as	  Seguro	  Popular	  de	  Salud,	  to	  provide	  health	  coverage	  
to	  individuals	  not	  covered	  by	  social	  security.	  The	  success	  of	  this	  pilot	  convinced	  the	  authorities	  to	  create	  
the	   System	   of	   Social	   Protection	   in	   Health	   in	   2004.	   Popular	   Health	   Insurance,	   or	   Seguro	   Popular	   (SP),	  
subsidizes	  an	  explicit	  set	  of	  health	  interventions.	  The	  main	  eligibility	  requirement	  for	  the	  program	  is	  not	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being	  insured	  by	  health	  institutions	  serving	  the	  formal	  sector	  (mainly	  IMSS	  and	  ISSSTE).	  Thus	  individuals	  
who	   are	   informal	   salaried	  workers,	   self-­‐employed,	   or	   not	   economically	   active	  may	   qualify.	   In	   theory,	  
there	   is	   a	   progressive	   SP	   premium.	   In	   reality,	   only	   two	   percent	   of	   the	   total	   beneficiaries	   make	   any	  
payment	   (CNPSS,	  2009).	  As	  a	   result,	  health	   spending	  has	   increased	   substantially	   to	   cover	   the	   costs	  of	  
increased	   demand	   for	   health	   services	   and	   to	   increase	   system	   capacity:	   between	   2000	   and	   2010,	   the	  
non-­‐contributory	  public	  expenditure	   in	  health	   increased	  5.6	  percent	  annually	  on	  average.	  The	  average	  
total	  per	  capita	  expenditure	  increased	  from	  1,080	  to	  1,620	  pesos	  of	  2010.4	  	  The	  federal	  authorities	  pay	  
for	  most	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  SP	  but	  state	  governments	  also	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  coverage	  and	  functioning	  of	  
the	  system	  (see	  appendix	  2	   for	  more	  details).	  A	   final	   feature	   to	  note	   is	   that	   the	  beneficiaries	  of	  other	  
federal	   social	   programs,	   particularly	  Oportunidades,	   can	   become	   automatically	   affiliated	   with	   Seguro	  
Popular.	  	  
Prior	   research	  on	   the	  effects	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  has	  mainly	   focused	  on	   its	  effect	  on	  health	  and	  health	  
care	   expenditures.	   There	   is	   no	   conclusive	   evidence	   of	   an	   impact	   of	   SP	   on	   health	   (Barros,	   2009).	  
However,	   utilization	   of	   health	   care	   services	   did	   increase	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   SP	   (Gakidou	   et	   al,	  
2006).	   Out	   of	   pocket	   health	   care	   expenditures	   decreased	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   SP	   (Barros,	   2009,	  
Gakidou	  et	  al	   ,	  2006,	  Galarraga	  et	  al,	  2010),	  and	  catastrophic	  health	  care	  expenditures	  also	  decreased	  
(Gakidou	  et	  al,	  2006,	  King	  et	  al,	  2009,	  Galarraga	  et	  al,	  2010).	  Thus,	  Seguro	  Popular	  decreased	  spending	  
on	   health	   services	   by	   previously	   uncovered	   individuals	   and	   increased	   the	   consumption	   of	   health	  
services.	   This	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   substantial	   value	   provided	   to	   workers	   covered	   by	   Seguro	   Popular,	  
which	  implies	  that	  Seguro	  Popular	  should	  make	  informality	  more	  attractive.	  
Progresa-Oportunidades 
The	   other	   component	   of	   the	   Mexican	   Social	   Protection	   System	   is	   an	   income	   redistribution	   strategy	  
based	   on	   a	   conditional	   cash	   transfer.	   The	   program,	   Programa	   de	   Educación,	   Salud	   y	   Alimentación	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 These estimates are based on the Annual Presidential Report to Congress, 2011.  
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(Progresa),	  started	  in	  1997	  as	  the	  principal	  anti-­‐poverty	  program	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government.	  Progresa	  
changed	  its	  name	  to	  Oportunidades	  in	  2002	  after	  the	  last	  rural	  expansion.	  This	  change	  also	  included	  the	  
expansion	   to	   semi-­‐urban	   and	   urban	   areas.	   Not	   all	   people	   living	   in	   urban	   areas	   are	   poor,	   so	   federal	  
authorities	   changed	   the	   coverage	   rules	   for	   urban	   areas.	   The	   program	   is	   advertised	   in	   villages	   using	  
various	   media,	   and	   those	   families	   interested	   in	   being	   covered	   visit	   the	   modules	   to	   apply	   for	   the	  
program.	   These	   modules	   are	   open	   for	   no	   more	   than	   four	   weeks	   and	   families	   must	   provide	   the	   full	  
information	  used	  to	  determine	  if	  they	  are	  eligible	  according	  to	  the	  official	  poverty	  threshold.	  Only	  40%	  
of	  the	  potentially	  eligible	  people	  applied	  (Behrman	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  After	  this	  initial	  enrollment	  phase,	  very	  
few	   additional	   households	   joined	   the	   program.	   The	   urban	   expansion	   of	   Oportunidades	   took	   place	   in	  
2002	   through	  2005,	  while	   the	   introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	   started	   in	  2002	  and	   is	   still	  ongoing.	  The	  
overlap	   between	   the	   expansion	   periods	   of	   Oportunidades	   and	   Seguro	   Popular	  makes	   it	   important	   to	  
include	  Oportunidades	  in	  our	  analysis.	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Informality in Mexico 
There	   is	   no	   official	   definition	   of	   informality.	   The	   Mexican	   Federal	   Labor	   Law	   makes	   no	   distinctions	  
among	  economic	  activities	  and	  requires	  all	  workers	  in	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  
formal	  social	  security	  system.	  Formal	  workers	  contribute	  to	  one	  of	  the	  social	  security	  systems,	  IMSS	  or	  
ISSSTE.	  The	  first	   is	  mainly	  for	  workers	   in	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  second	  for	  public	  employees.	   IMSS	  
provides	   insurance	   for	   health	   and	  maternity,	   old	   age	   retirement,	   severance	   at	   old	   age,	   disability,	   life,	  
child-­‐care	  services	  and	  workers	  compensation.	  Workers	  contributing	  to	  IMSS	  must	  also	  contribute	  to	  an	  
individualized	   housing	   fund	   managed	   by	   an	   agency	   called	   INFONAVIT.	   The	   distribution	   contributions	  
among	   employers,	   employees	   and	   the	   federal	   government	   are	   described	   in	   Appendix	   2.	   Total	  
contributions	  are	  equivalent	   to	  31.5	  percent	  of	   total	  wage	  on	  average.	  Every	  type	  of	   insurance	  has	   its	  
own	  contribution	  limits.	  	  
Given	   the	   lack	   of	   official	   definition	   of	   informality	  we	  decided	   to	   use	   several	   definitions	   of	   informality	  
based	  on	  the	  requirements	  to	  be	  covered	  by	  Seguro	  Popular.	  The	  Federal	  Law	  on	  Health	  clearly	  states	  
that	  all	  individuals	  not	  covered	  by	  any	  of	  the	  social	  security	  systems	  or	  without	  access	  to	  health	  services	  
can	  be	  covered	  by	  Seguro	  Popular.5	  	  We	  use	  the	  following	  definitions:	  
1. No	  health	  or	  self-­‐employed:	  workers	  who	  declared	  either	  being	  salaried	  workers	  not	  covered	  by	  
social	  security,	  or	  being	  self-­‐employed.	  	  
2. Self-­‐employed.	  
3. Small	  firm:	  workers	  who	  declared	  to	  be	  employed	  in	  firms	  with	  less	  than	  5	  employees.	  	  
4. No	  Contract:	  workers	  who	  declared	  that	  they	  had	  not	  signed	  a	  contract	  in	  their	  current	  job.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  Federal	  Health	  Law	  says,	  “Article	  77	  bis	  3.-­‐	  All	  households	  and	  people	  not	  covered	  by	  social	  security	  institutes	  
or	  having	  no	  health	  coverage	  will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  System	  for	  Social	  Protection	  in	  Health	  according	  to	  their	  
official	  address.	  This	  will	  guarantee	  access	  to	  all	  health	  services	  provided	  by	  the	  law.”	  (Translation	  by	  the	  authors).	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The	   first	   definition	   is	   our	   preferred	   one	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   since	   contributing	   to	   formal	   health	  
insurance	   is	   required	   by	   law,	   this	   clearly	   identifies	   a	   group	   of	   workers	   who	   are	   not	   complying	   with	  
formal	   requirements.	   By	   contrast,	   other	   measures	   do	   not	   directly	   capture	   this	   element	   of	   non	  
compliance:	  for	  example,	  even	  though	  workers	  in	  small	  firms	  are	  often	  informal,	  some	  of	  these	  workers	  
may	  contribute	  to	  the	  formal	  social	  security	  system.	  Second,	  the	  most	  direct	  impact	  of	  SP	  should	  be	  to	  
incentivize	  workers	  to	  drop	  formal	  health	  coverage.	  This	  is	  why	  definition	  1	  defines	  as	  informal	  anyone	  
who	  is	  salaried	  and	  does	  not	  have	  formal	  health	  coverage.	  We	  add	  to	  this	  definition	  the	  self-­‐employed,	  
since	   the	   question	   about	   health	   coverage	   is	   not	   asked	   of	   them,	   and	   they	   are	   in	   practice	   unlikely	   to	  
contribute	  to	  formal	  health	  insurance.	  Using	  the	  first	  definition,	  the	  average	  size	  of	  informality	  is	  around	  
50%	  (Table	  1).	  This	  will	  facilitate	  our	  analysis,	  since	  linear	  probability	  and	  probit	  models	  have	  the	  same	  
point	  estimates	  when	  the	  average	  value	  of	  the	  variable	  is	  close	  to	  0.5.	  
	  
	   	  
	   11	  
Theoretical	  framework	  
Seguro	   Popular	   is	   a	   health	   benefit	   that	   is	   given	   to	   those	  who	  work	   informally	   (without	   formal	   health	  
benefits)	  or	  do	  not	  work	  at	  all.	  Since	  this	  paper	  considers	  the	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  informality,	  
we	  concentrate	  on	  the	  choice	  between	  working	  in	  the	  formal	  versus	  the	  informal	  sector	  and	  ignore	  the	  
choice	  of	  being	  out	  of	   the	   labor	   force6.	  Assume	   that	   the	  utility	  of	  working	   in	   a	   formal	   job	   is	   given	  by	  
	   where	  w!	   is	   the	   wage	   in	   the	   formal	   sector,	   	   	   are	   non-­‐pecuniary	   benefits	   in	   the	  
formal	   sector,	   and	   	  α ≤ 1	   is	   the	   value	   that	  workers	   place	   on	   non-­‐pecuniary	   benefits.	   	   	   Similarly,	   the	  
utility	   of	   working	   in	   the	   informal	   sector	   is	  U! = w! + αb!.	   A	   worker	   chooses	   to	   work	   in	   the	   informal	  
sector	  if	  U!-­‐U! > 0,	  i.e.	  if	   	  	  
Seguro	   Popular	   increases	   the	   value	   of	   	   and	   hence	   the	   utility	   of	   working	   informally	   relative	   to	   the	  
utility	  of	  working	  formally.	  In	  other	  words,	  Seguro	  Popular	  should,	  all	  else	  equal,	  increase	  the	  proportion	  
of	   informal	   workers	   by	   encouraging	   formal	   workers	   to	   become	   informal	   and	   discouraging	   informal	  
workers	  from	  becoming	  formal.	  Given	  the	  substantial	  flows	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  the	  informal	  sector	  
in	  Mexico	  (Bosch	  and	  Maloney,	  2007),	  both	  mechanisms	  should	  be	  relevant.	  	  
However,	   the	   size	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   Seguro	   Popular	   on	   informality	   may	   in	   practice	   depend	   on	   a	   few	  
additional	   considerations.	   First,	   even	   prior	   to	  Seguro	   Popular,	  workers	  without	   health	   coverage	   could	  
access	  public	  clinics	  and	  benefited	  from	  a	  small	  health	  care	  subsidy.	  Seguro	  Popular	  makes	  this	  subsidy	  
much	  more	  substantial	  and	  systematic.	  As	  of	  2009,	   the	  cost	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  was	  1,645.3	  pesos	  per	  
enrolled	  person,7	  which	  represents	  5%	  of	  an	  average	  worker’s	  yearly	  wages.	  This	  amount	  is	  substantial.	  
For	  reference,	  the	  share	  of	  health	  insurance	  costs	  out	  of	  total	  compensation	  for	  the	  US	  is6.7%	  (Gruber	  
and	  Madrian,	  2002).	  Second,	  the	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  informality	  depends	  on	  how	  large	   	  is:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In	  practice,	  Seguro	  Popular	  does	  not	  affect	  labor	  force	  participation.	  We	  have	  repeated	  the	  analysis	  of	  Table 3	  
using	  labor	  force	  participation	  as	  the	  left-­‐hand	  side	  variable	  and	  found	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  labor	  
force	  participation	  is	  both	  very	  small	  and	  statistically	  insignificant.	  
7 Source: Comision Nacional de Protección Social en Salud. Informe 2010.  
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the	  more	  workers	  value	  non-­‐pecuniary	  benefits,	  the	  larger	  the	  impact.	  This	  suggests	  that	  older	  workers,	  
whose	  health	  tends	  to	  be	  poorer,	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  become	  (or	  stay)	  informal	  after	  the	  introduction	  
of	  Seguro	  Popular.	  Additionally,	  in	  Mexico,	  formal	  sector	  workers	  can	  provide	  health	  coverage	  for	  their	  
family.	  Thus,	  the	  value	  of	  benefits	  is	  higher	  for	  the	  first	  family	  member	  who	  works	  formally,	  and	  so	  there	  
is	   a	   stronger	   incentive	   for	   primary	   earners	  with	   larger	   families	   to	  work	   in	   the	   formal	   sector.	   Thus	  we	  
expect	   the	   impact	   of	   Seguro	   Popular	   on	   informality	   to	   be	   stronger	   for	   workers	   who	   are	   heads	   of	  
households	   and	  married	  with	   children.	   Third,	   the	   impact	  depends	  on	  how	  many	  workers	   are	   close	   to	  
indifferent	  between	  working	   in	   the	   informal	  versus	   the	   formal	   sector,	  and	  could	   thus	  be	   swayed	  by	  a	  
change	   in	  benefits	   in	   the	   informal	   sector.	   The	   fact	   that	   there	  are	  many	  workers	  who	   switch	   from	   the	  
formal	   to	   the	   informal	   sector	   and	   vice-­‐versa	   suggests	   that	  many	  workers	  may	   be	   close	   to	   indifferent	  
between	  the	  two	  sectors,	  and	  therefore	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  informality	  may	  be	  large.	  
Fourth,	  we	  expect	  that	  informality	  will	  increase	  more	  for	  less	  educated	  workers	  when	  Seguro	  Popular	  is	  
introduced,	  as	  these	  workers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  informal	  to	  start	  with.	  Highly	  qualified	  workers	  such	  
as	   engineers	   would	   typically	   work	   for	   larger,	   formal	   firms.	   We	   expect	   such	   workers	   to	   have	   fewer	  
opportunities	   to	   practice	   their	   trade	   informally	   than,	   say,	   a	   salesperson.	   To	   summarize,	   we	   expect	  
Seguro	  Popular	  to	  increase	  informality,	  and	  this	  effect	  should	  be	  larger	  for	  less	  educated	  workers,	  older	  
workers,	  and	  for	  household	  heads	  married	  with	  children.	  
In	  the	  empirical	  analysis,	  we	  will	  also	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  transitions	  between	  the	  
formal	  sector,	  the	  informal	  sector,	  and	  non-­‐employment,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  wages	  of	  workers	  who	  move	  
between	  the	  formal	  and	  the	  informal	  sectors.	  The	  rationale	  for	  looking	  at	  transitions	  is	  that	  if	  informality	  
became	  more	  attractive	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular,	  we	  may	  expect	  to	  see	  more	  transitions	  
from	  formality	  to	  informality	  and	  fewer	  transitions	  in	  the	  reverse	  direction.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  interesting	  
to	   look	   at	   whether	   the	   expected	   increase	   in	   informality	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   SP	   comes	   from	   an	  
increase	  in	  the	  transitions	  from	  formality	  to	  informality,	  or	  from	  non	  employment	  to	  informality.	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We	   investigate	   empirically	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   introduction	   of	   SP	   on	   the	  wages	   of	   job	   switchers.	   For	   a	  
worker,	  to	  switch	  from	  the	  formal	  to	  the	  informal	  sector,	  we	  must	  have	  !! − !! > ! !! − !! .	  The	  left	  
hand	   side	   is	   the	   wage	   gain	   from	   moving	   to	   informality.	   	   When	   SP	   is	   introduced,	   	   increases.	   This	  
implies	  that,	  as	  long	  as	  ! > 0,	  the	  wage	  gain	  from	  moving	  from	  the	  formal	  to	  the	  informal	  sector	  should	  
be	   lower	  after	   the	   introduction	  of	  SP.	   In	  other	  words,	   if	  workers	  value	  health	  benefits,	   the	  wage	  gain	  
from	  moving	  from	  the	  formal	  to	  the	   informal	  sector	  should	  be	   lower	  after	  the	   introduction	  of	  SP	  (and	  
conversely	  the	  wage	  gain	  from	  moving	  the	  formal	  sector	  should	  be	  higher).	  
The	   simple	   theoretical	   framework	   developed	   above	   assumes	   that	   workers	   have	   a	   choice	   between	  
holding	   a	   formal	   or	   an	   informal	   job.	   Models	   of	   segmented	   or	   dual	   labor	   markets	   question	   this	  
assumption.	  If	  wages	  in	  the	  formal	  sector	  are	  set	  above	  market-­‐clearing	  levels,	  rationing	  ensues,	  so	  that	  
there	  are	  more	  workers	  willing	  to	  work	  formally	  than	  formal	  jobs.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  less	  straightforward	  
that	   providing	   benefits	   to	   informal	  workers	  will	   increase	   informality.	   Clearly,	   in	   such	   a	  model,	   formal	  
workers	  would	  be	  unwilling	  to	  move	  to	  an	  informal	  job,	  even	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  SP.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  if	  searching	  for	  a	  formal	  job	  is	  costly,	   informal	  workers	  may	  reduce	  their	  search	  efforts	  after	  the	  
introduction	  of	  SP,	  which	  would	  result	   in	  a	   lower	  probability	  of	   finding	  a	  formal	   job.	  Empirically,	   if	   the	  
segmented	   labor	  market	  model	   is	   valid,	  we	   should	   see	   no	   change	   in	   the	   transitions	   from	   the	   formal	  
sector	   to	   the	   informal	   sector	  after	   SP	   is	   introduced,	  but	  possibly	  a	  decline	   in	   the	   transitions	   from	   the	  
informal	   to	   the	   formal	   sector.	  Overall,	   in	   a	   segmented	   labor	  market,	   the	   impact	   of	   SP	   on	   informality	  
would	  be	  smaller	  than	  in	  a	  competitive	  labor	  market.	  
Currently,	  the	  literature	  testing	  for	  segmented	  labor	  markets	  versus	  competitive	  labor	  markets	  indicates	  
that	  in	  most	  countries	  there	  are	  indeed	  some	  informal	  workers	  who	  are	  priced	  out	  of	  the	  formal	  labor	  
market,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   for	   all	   informal	   workers.	   Self-­‐employed	   workers,	   who	   are	   typically	  
informal,	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   excluded	   from	   the	   formal	   labor	  market;	   instead,	   they	   seem	   to	  willingly	  
choose	  their	  informal	  self-­‐employed	  jobs	  (Perry	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  Mexico,	  where	  
ib
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self-­‐employed	  workers	  earn	  more	  than	  formal	  sector	  workers	  with	  similar	  characteristics	   (Bargain	  and	  
Kwenda,	  2010).	  Therefore,	  while	  segmentation	  in	  the	  Mexican	  labor	  market	  may	  exist,	  we	  can	  at	   least	  
use	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  competitive	  labor	  market	  for	  self-­‐employed	  workers.	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  Oportunidades	  on	  informality,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  program	  to	  urban	  
areas	   may	   be	   associated	   with	   higher	   informality.	   SP	   and	   Oportunidades	   were	   introduced	   during	   the	  
same	   time	   frame	   in	   urban	   areas,	   so	   the	   analysis	  must	   clearly	   differentiate	   both	  parts	   of	   the	  Mexican	  
social	   protection	   system.	   Oportunidades	   has	   been	   very	   successful	   in	   the	   countryside,	   but	   there	   few	  
workers	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  the	  margin	  between	  working	  formally	  or	  informally:	  most	  agricultural	  jobs	  are	  
informal,	  and	  formal	  jobs	  are	  mostly	  unavailable.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  program	  is	  a	  conditional	  
cash	   transfer	   and	   it	   is	  means-­‐tested.	   There	   is	   some	   anecdotal	   evidence	   that	   applicants	   try	   to	   pass	   as	  
poor	  by	  hiding	   their	  assets	  when	  being	  visited	  at	  home	  by	  evaluators.	  Similarly,	  people	  may	  prefer	   to	  
work	   informally	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   conceal	   their	   income	   more	   easily.	   Thus,	   the	   introduction	   of	  
Oportunidades	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  informality.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Seguro	  Popular,	  we	  
would	  expect	  this	  increase	  to	  be	  larger	  for	  groups	  that	  are	  nearly	  indifferent	  between	  working	  formally	  
and	  informally.	  However,	  the	  incentive	  for	  informality	  may	  not	  fully	  play	  out	  given	  the	  short	  enrollment	  
period:	  there	  was	  little	  time	  for	  people	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  program	  and	  think	  of	  strategies	  to	  qualify	  for	  
it,	   such	   as	   holding	   an	   informal	   job.	   Still,	   we	   feel	   it	   is	   important	   to	   test	   whether	   the	   introduction	   of	  
Oportunidades	  to	  urban	  areas	  was	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  informality.	  Also,	  Oportunidades	  was	  
rolled	  out	  during	  roughly	  the	  same	  period	  as	  Seguro	  Popular,	  and,	  where	  Oportunidades	  was	  present,	  it	  
was	  a	  key	  mechanism	  for	  enrolling	  people	  in	  Seguro	  Popular	  (Scott,	  2006).	  It	  is	  thus	  important	  to	  look	  at	  
the	  impact	  of	  both	  SP	  and	  Oportunidades	  on	  informality	   in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  which	  one,	   if	  any,	  had	  a	  
greater	  effect.	  
	   15	  
Data	  
This	   paper	   employs	   four	   sets	   of	   data:	   census	   data	   for	   the	   total	   population	   and	   households,	   labor	  
surveys,	   and	   the	   roll-­‐out	   information	   of	   Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	   and	   Seguro	   Popular.	   The	   first	   two	  
datasets	   are	   provided	   by	   Instituto	   Nacional	   de	   Estadistica	   y	   Geografia	   (INEGI),	   Mexican	   Bureau	   of	  
Statistics	  and	  the	  Consejo	  Nacional	  de	  Población	  (CONAPO).	  The	  information	  on	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  
was	   taken	   from	   the	   historical	   census	   of	   beneficiaries.	   It	   was	   provided	   by	   the	   National	   Office	   of	  
Oportunidades	   (Coordinacion	   Nacional	   de	   Oportunidades).	   The	   information	   on	   Seguro	   Popular	   was	  
provided	  by	   the	  Comision	  Nacional	  de	  Proteccion	  Social	  en	  Salud,	   the	   federal	  agency	   that	   coordinates	  
the	  affiliation	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  program	  through	  the	  country.	  	  
Total Population and Households 
Our	   analysis	   includes	  demographic	   information	  on	   the	  population	   and	   total	   number	  of	   households	   at	  
the	   village	   level.	   We	   estimated	   the	   total	   population	   for	   the	   intra-­‐census	   periods	   (the	   census	   is	  
established	  every	  5	  years)	  using	  the	  compound	  rate	  of	  growth	  between	  censuses.8	  This	  was	  done	  for	  the	  
periods	  1991-­‐1994,	  1996-­‐1999	  and	  2001-­‐2004.	  For	  the	  period	  2006-­‐2009	  we	  used	  the	  official	  population	  
estimations	   by	   CONAPO	   at	   the	   village	   level.	   To	   estimate	   the	   total	   number	   of	   households	   during	   the	  
period,	   we	   assumed	   the	   same	   household	   size	   of	   2005	   and	   extrapolated	   it	   using	   the	   information	   on	  
population.	  	  
We	  restrict	  the	  data	  to	  villages	  with	  more	  than	  20,000	  inhabitants,	  i.e.	  urban	  villages.	  Indeed,	  the	  survey	  
we	  have	  only	  consistently	  covers	  urban	  areas.	  When	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  urban	  Oportundiades,	  we	  
further	  restrict	  the	  sample	  to	  villages	  with	  more	  than	  50,000	  inhabitants	  since	  this	  was	  the	  criterion	  for	  
inclusion	  in	  the	  urban	  expansion	  of	  Oportunidades.	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Employment Surveys: ENE and ENOE 
The	   information	   on	   employment	   comes	   from	   the	  Mexican	   Labor	   Surveys	   from	  1995	   to	   2009.	   For	   the	  
period	   1995-­‐2004,	  we	  used	   the	  National	   Employment	   Survey	   (ENE)	   and	   for	   the	  period	   2005-­‐2009	  we	  
used	  the	  National	  Survey	  of	  Occupation	  and	  Employment	  (ENOE),	  which	  is	  the	  new	  version	  of	  the	  ENE.	  
In	  each	  of	  these	  surveys,	  every	  economically	  active	  worker	  of	  the	  selected	  dwellings	  is	   interviewed	  for	  
five	  consecutive	  quarters	  and	  then	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  representative	  unit	  of	  analysis.9	  To	  avoid	  attrition	  
issues,	  we	  only	  used	  the	  first	  interview	  of	  every	  individual	  for	  most	  of	  our	  analysis.	  In	  our	  transition	  and	  
wage	  analysis,	  we	  used	  the	  first	  two	  interviews.	  	  	  
Other variables 
We	   created	   a	   dataset	   that	   contains	   information	   on	   the	   total	   number	   of	   doctors,	   total	   number	   of	  
hospitals	  and	  the	  local	  total	  consumption	  of	  electricity.	  This	  data	  is	  recorded	  by	  municipality	  during	  the	  
period	   1995-­‐2009.	   The	   yearly	   growth	   of	   electricity	   consumption	   was	   taken	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   the	   local	  
economic	  conditions	  in	  the	  municipality.	  As	  described	  by	  Heckman	  (2010),	  formal	  employment	  seems	  to	  
be	   closely	   related	   to	   economic	   performance.	   We	   created	   these	   variables	   using	   the	   state	   statistical	  
yearbooks	   for	   all	   of	   the	   states	   in	   Mexico,	   which	   include	   both	   state	   and	   municipal	   information.	   The	  
information	   on	   doctors	   and	   hospitals	   is	   reported	   directly	   from	   the	   state	  ministries	   of	   health	   and	   the	  
information	   on	   electricity	   consumption	   is	   provided	   directly	   by	   the	   two	   public	   electric	   companies	   in	  
Mexico:	   Compania	   de	   Luz	   y	   Fuerza	   del	   Centro	   (CLyFC)	   and	   Comisión	   Federal	   de	   Electricidad	   (CFE).10	  	  
Table	  1	  gives	  summary	  statistics.	  Note	  that	  50%	  of	  the	  population	  works	   informally,	   i.e.	  has	  no	  health	  
benefits	   or	   is	   self-­‐employed.	   We	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   programs	   on	  
informality.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For	  more	  details	  see	  INEGI	  (2007),	  which	  contains	  a	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  the	  surveys.	  	  
10	  CLyFC	  was	  closed	  down	  in	  2009	  and	  CFE	  is	  now	  the	  national	  producer,	  distributor	  and	  retailer	  of	  electricity	  in	  the	  
country.	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Results	  
Endogeneity analysis 
Before	   examining	   the	   impact	   of	   Mexico’s	   social	   protection	   programs	   on	   informality,	   it	   is	   prudent	   to	  
assess	  to	  what	  degree	  our	  identification	  strategy	  is	  valid.	  Using	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  
Popular	  as	  a	  source	  of	  identification	  assumes	  that	  this	  timing	  is	  not	  correlated	  with	  the	  key	  outcome	  of	  
interest,	   labor	  market	   informality.	  While	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   test	   directly	   whether	   the	   timing	   of	   the	  
introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  was	  endogenous,	  we	  can	  examine	  whether	  the	  year	  of	   introduction	  of	  
Seguro	  Popular	  is	  predicted	  by	  observable	  variables	  in	  2000.	  	  
We	  use	  a	  complete	  set	  of	  municipalities’	  characteristics	  from	  the	  2000	  Census,	  which	  occurred	  	  prior	  to	  
the	   earliest	   implementation	  of	   SP	   in	   2002.	  As	   shown	   in	  Table	  2,	  we	   found	   that	  municipalities	  with	   a	  
higher	  share	  of	  informal	  workers	  were	  covered	  significantly	  later	  than	  average	  (column	  1).	  In	  column	  2,	  
we	   add	   state-­‐level	   controls.	   The	   reason	   for	   doing	   so	   is	   that	   state	   governments	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	  
coverage	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  SP	  program.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  program	  and	  the	  
corresponding	  funds	  to	  the	  states	  are	  defined	  by	  both	  federal	  and	  state	  governments.	  Some	  accounts	  of	  
the	  program’s	   implementation	  suggest	  that	  smaller	  states	  were	  covered	  first	  (Gonzalez-­‐Pier[2006]	  and	  
personal	   interview).	   The	   federal	   authorities	   first	   implemented	   the	   plan	   looking	   for	   a	   small	   scale	   and,	  
once	   they	   verified	   its	   functioning,	   more	   states	   were	   included.	  We	   find	   that	   indeed	   municipalities	   in	  
larger	   states	   introduced	   SP	   significantly	   later	   (column	   2).	   In	   column	   3,	   we	   use	   controls	   at	   the	  
municipality	   level.	   Under	   this	   specification	   informality	   becomes	   insignificant,	   and	   all	   municipal-­‐level	  
controls	  except	  for	  population	  are	  also	  insignificant.	  Still,	  we	  see	  that	  larger	  municipalities	  introduced	  SP	  
earlier.	   Finally,	   in	   column	   4	   we	   also	   add	   state	   fixed	   effects.	   We	   find	   that	   municipalities	   with	   more	  
doctors	  per	  capita	  and	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  males	   introduced	  SP	  earlier,	  while	  municipalities	  with	  a	  more	  
educated	  workforce	  introduced	  SP	  later.	  Importantly,	  once	  state	  fixed	  effects	  are	  added,	  the	  coefficient	  
on	   informality	   is	   much	   closer	   to	   0,	   thus	   confirming	   that	   informality	   per	   se	   is	   not	   a	   significant	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determinant	  of	  the	  timing	  of	  introduction	  of	  SP	  at	  the	  municipality	  level.	  In	  columns	  5-­‐8,	  we	  repeat	  the	  
analysis	   from	   columns	   1-­‐4,	   but	   the	   left-­‐hand	   side	   variable	   is	   a	   dummy	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
program	  after	  the	  pilot	  phase,	  i.e.	  in	  2004	  or	  later.	  The	  results	  are	  qualitatively	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  
columns	   1-­‐4,	  with	   a	   few	  notable	   exceptions.	   First,	   the	   coefficient	   on	   the	   “governor	   PRD”11	   dummy	   is	  
significant	  (column	  6),	  showing	  that	  these	  states	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  introduce	  SP	  late	  –the	  analysis	  does	  
not	  include	  Mexico	  City,	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  Mexican	  Federal	  government	  is	  mainly	  located	  in	  
Mexico	   City	   and	   there	   was	   a	   political	   dispute	   over	   Seguro	   Popular	   since	   its	   creation.	   After	   different	  
negotiations,	  the	  local	  government	  signed	  the	  agreement	  to	  start	  the	  coverage	  by	  2005,	  but	  it	  remained	  
as	   the	   state	   with	   the	   lowest	   coverage	   until	   now.	   Informality	   is	   never	   found	   to	   be	   a	   significant	  
determinant	  of	  late	  introduction.	  
Overall,	  we	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  informality	  in	  municipalities	  determined	  the	  timing	  
of	  the	  expansion	  of	  Seguro	  Popular.	  These	  results	  support	  our	  identification	  strategy.	  
The	  Impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  Informality	  
We	  estimate	   linear	  probability	  models,	   regressing	   the	   indicator	   for	   informality	  on	  an	   indicator	   for	   the	  
presence	  of	  the	  program	  under	  consideration.	  We	  always	   include	  municipality	  fixed	  effects	  and	  report	  
robust	   standard	   errors	   clustered	   by	  municipality.	   Table	   3	   presents	   the	   results	   for	   Seguro	   Popular.	   In	  
column	  1,	  Seguro	  Popular	  is	  found	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  and	  insignificant	  effect	  on	  informality.	  In	  column	  2,	  
as	   controls	   are	   added,	   the	   effect	   of	   Seguro	   Popular	   becomes	   positive	   but	   remains	   insignificant.	   Note	  
that	   the	  demographic	   controls	   themselves	   (age,	   gender,	   schooling	  and	   sector	  of	  work)	   are	   associated	  
with	   informality	   in	   the	  ways	   described	   by	   the	   literature	   on	   informality	   in	   Latin	   America	   (Perry	   et	   al.,	  
2007).	   In	   subsequent	   columns,	  we	   focus	   on	   sub-­‐groups	   in	   the	   population	   that	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   see	  
their	  informality	  status	  affected	  by	  Seguro	  Popular.	  We	  first	  examine	  the	  case	  of	  less	  educated	  workers,	  
and	   specifically	   workers	   with	   9	   years	   of	   schooling	   or	   less	   (9	   years	   is	   the	   median	   of	   the	   schooling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  PRD	  is	  the	  acronym	  of	  “Partido	  de	  la	  Revolucion	  Democratica”.	  It	  is	  national	  political	  party	  and	  is	  considered	  to	  
the	  left	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	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distribution).	  We	  argue	  that	  these	  workers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  opportunities	  to	  work	  in	  the	  informal	  
sector	  than	  more	  educated	  workers.	  For	  less	  educated	  workers,	  Seguro	  Popular	  is	  found	  to	  significantly	  
increase	   informality,	   both	   without	   and	   with	   controls	   (columns	   3	   and	   4).	   Controlling	   for	   relevant	  
covariates,	  we	  find	  that	  less	  educated	  workers	  are	  0.8	  percentage	  points	  more	  likely	  to	  work	  informally	  
after	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  (60%	  of	  this	  group	  works	  informally	  on	  average).	  The	  effect	  of	  
Seguro	  Popular	  on	  males	  is	  positive	  but	  falls	  short	  of	  statistical	  significance,	  once	  relevant	  controls	  are	  
added	   (column	   6).	   Among	   less	   educated	   workers,	   the	   effect	   of	   Seguro	   Popular	   is	   stronger	   for	   those	  
workers	  who	   are	   household	   heads	  married	  with	   children	   (column	   8)	   or	   over	   34	   years	   old	   (this	   is	   the	  
median	  of	   the	  age	  distribution;	   see	  column	  10).	  Thus,	  as	  expected,	  married	  workers	  with	  children	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  react	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  because	  they	  would	  provide	  health	  benefits	  
for	   their	  whole	   family	   if	  working	   in	   the	   formal	   sector.	   The	   value	   of	   health	   benefits	   is	   thus	   higher	   for	  
married	  workers	  with	  children	  than	  for	  workers	  who	  are	  only	  seeking	  to	  cover	  themselves.	  As	  for	  older	  
workers,	  their	  health	  is	  presumably	  somewhat	  worse	  than	  the	  health	  of	  younger	  people	  and	  hence	  the	  
value	  of	  health	  benefits	   is	  higher	  for	  them,	  allowing	  them	  to	  choose	  a	  more	  flexible	  occupation	   in	  the	  
informal	  sector.	  This	  could	  explain	  why	  they	  react	  more	  strongly	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular.	  	  
For	   all	   three	   sub-­‐groups	  where	   a	   significant	   effect	   of	   Seguro	   Popular	   on	   informality	  was	   found12,	   the	  
effect	  was	  of	  the	  order	  of	  1	  percentage	  point,	  which	  is	  a	  very	  small	  effect	  (less	  than	  2%)	  given	  that	  more	  
than	  half	  the	  labor	  force	  in	  this	  groups	  is	  informal.	  One	  can	  also	  see	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  small	  by	  comparing	  
it	  to	  the	  results	  from	  Heim	  and	  Lurie	  (2010).	  Indeed,	  Heim	  and	  Lurie	  find	  that	  a	  7%	  decline	  in	  the	  price	  of	  
health	  insurance	  when	  self-­‐employed	  led	  to	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  self-­‐employment	  in	  the	  US.	  In	  our	  case,	  SP	  
represented	  an	  almost	  100%	  decline	  in	  the	  price	  of	   insurance	  (i.e.	  a	  health	  care	  package	  similar	  to	  the	  
one	   provided	   by	   IMSS	   became	   available	   for	   free)	   and	   yet	   the	   impact	   on	   informality	   was	   overall	  
insignificantly	  different	  from	  0.	  This	  suggests	  that	  either	  Seguro	  Popular	  did	  not	  provide	  much	  value	  so	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Entrepreneurs may also be more sensitive to the incentives introduced by SP. We have analyzed the impact of SP 
on the informality of business owners, and found no significant effect. 
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that	  the	  increase	  in	  health	  benefits	  for	  informal	  workers	  was	  minimal,	  or	  that	  very	  few	  workers	  choose	  
to	  be	   formal	  or	   informal	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  availability	  of	  health	  benefits.	  The	   first	  explanation	   is	  not	  
very	  plausible.	  While	  Seguro	  Popular	  did	  not	  cover	  as	  many	  procedures	  initially	  as	  employment-­‐related	  
health	  plans	  (mostly	  IMSS),	  the	  coverage	  was	  expanded	  substantially	  over	  time.	  Additionally,	  the	  quality	  
of	  care	   in	  Seguro	  Popular	  was	  arguably	   lower	   than	   in	   IMSS	  to	  start	  with,	  but	   it	   improved	  as	  well	  over	  
time.13	  More	  likely,	  workers	  who	  are	  otherwise	  close	  to	  indifferent	  between	  working	  in	  the	  formal	  and	  
the	  informal	  sector	  do	  not	  value	  health	  benefits	  very	  much.	  Hence,	  even	  a	  very	  substantial	  change	  in	  the	  
health	   benefits	   provided	   to	   informal	   workers	   is	   unlikely	   to	   affect	   most	   workers’	   decisions	   to	   work	  
informally.	  	  
One	   concern	   with	   the	   interpretation	   of	   our	   finding	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   informality	   for	   less	   educated	  
workers	   is	   that	   informality	  was	  trending	  upwards	  already	  prior	   to	  the	   introduction	  of	  SP.	   If	   that	   is	   the	  
case,	   the	   observed	   increase	   in	   informality	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   SP	   may	   be	   due	   to	   trends	   in	  
informality	   rather	   than	   to	   SP	   itself.	   To	   address	   this	   concern,	   we	   examine	   informality	   around	   the	  
introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular.	  Specifically,	  we	  look	  at	  informality	  up	  to	  four	  years	  before	  and	  two	  years	  
after14	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  program	  and	  we	  restrict	  the	  sample	  to	  a	  balanced	  panel	  of	  municipalities.	  
We	   use	   our	   typical	   set	   of	   controls	   to	   account	   for	   other	   confounds15.	   Figure	   1	   plots	   the	   results.	   The	  
coefficients	  are	  estimated	  relative	  to	  the	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular.	  We	  can	  see	  
that	   there	   is	   a	   significant	   jump	   in	   the	   propensity	   to	   work	   informally	   in	   the	   first	   year	   where	   Seguro	  
Popular	   was	   introduced	   (year	   0).	   Two	   and	   three	   years	   prior	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   program,	   the	  
propensity	   to	   be	   informal	  was	   essentially	   the	   same	   as	   one	   year	   prior	   to	   the	   introduction.	   Four	   years	  
prior	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   program,	   informality	   was	   significantly	   lower,	   but	   not	   much	   lower.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Sistema	  de	  Proteccion	  Social	  en	  Salud.	  Annual	  reports	  2005-­‐2010	  
14 Since we take as reference year the year before the introduction of SP, going back up to 4 years before the 
introduction of SP allows us to look at 3 periods prior to the reference year. Symmetrically, going up to 2 years after 
the introduction of SP allows us to examine 3 periods after the reference year. 
15	  The	  results	  are	  not	  substantially	  affected	  if	  we	  don’t	  use	  any	  controls.	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Overall,	  there	  is	  some	  weak	  evidence	  for	  an	  increasing	  trend	  in	  informality	  prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  
Seguro	  Popular.	  To	  check	  whether	  our	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  such	  a	  trend,	  we	  added	  state-­‐specific	  time	  
trends	  to	  the	  specifications	  in	  columns	  3	  and	  4	  of	  Table	  3	  and	  found	  that	  the	  results	  are	  not	  significantly	  
different	  (results	  not	  shown).	  	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  program	  in	  the	  second	  year	  (year	  1)	  and	  third	  year	  (year	  
2)	  after	  the	  introduction	  is	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  first	  year,	  which	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  further	  expansion	  of	  
the	  program.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  effect	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	   in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  year	   is	  not	  significantly	  
different	  from	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  first	  year.	  We	  conclude	  from	  this	  exercise	  that	  the	  estimated	  impact	  of	  
Seguro	  Popular	  on	  the	  informality	  of	  less	  educated	  workers	  is	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  program	  itself,	  and	  
not	  to	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  trend	  in	  informality.	  
While	  the	  impact	  of	  SP	  on	  informality	  in	  the	  first	  three	  years	  seems	  stable,	  one	  may	  be	  concerned	  that	  
as	  program	  capacity	  and	  enrollment	  increase,	  the	  impact	  on	  informality	  may	  also	  increase	  beyond	  three	  
years.	  To	  address	  this	   issue,	  we	   look	  at	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  program	  up	  to	  5	  years	  after	   its	   introduction	  
(Figure	  4	   in	   the	  appendix),	  which	   restricts	   the	  sample	   to	  municipalities	   that	   introduced	  SP	   in	  2004	  or	  
earlier.	  This	  figure	  confirms	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  SP	  on	  informality	  does	  not	  increase	  over	  time:	  5	  years	  out	  
the	  impact	  is	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  second	  year	  when	  the	  program	  was	  introduced.	  Given	  that	  
the	  estimate	  of	   the	   long-­‐run	   impact	  of	   SP	   is	  based	  by	  necessity	  on	  municipalities	   that	   introduced	   the	  
program	   early,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   check	   whether	   the	   impact	   of	   SP	   was	   different	   in	   early	   versus	   late	  
adopters.	  A	  further	  benefit	  of	  this	  check	  is	  that	  it	  gives	  some	  indication	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  program	  may	  have	  been	  correlated	  with	  expected	  impacts	  on	  informality.	  In	  Figure	  
4	  in	  the	  appendix,	  we	  plot	  the	  impact	  of	  SP	  on	  informality	  for	  workers	  with	  9	  years	  of	  schooling	  or	  less	  in	  
municipalities	  that	  were	  early	  adopters	  (prior	  to	  2004)	  versus	  municipalities	  that	  were	  late	  adopters.	  We	  
find	  that	  the	  results	  are	  very	  similar	  among	  early	  and	  late	  adopters.	  We	  conclude	  that	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  
the	  roll-­‐out	  of	  SP	  was	  designed	  according	  to	  expected	   impacts	  on	   informality.	  Additionally,	  since	  early	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and	  late	  adopters	  are	  similarly	  impacted	  by	  SP,	  the	  estimate	  of	  the	  long-­‐run	  impact	  of	  SP	  based	  on	  early	  
adopters	  is	  likely	  robust.	  We	  can	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  SP	  did	  not	  increase	  over	  time.	  	  	  
We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  estimation	  of	   the	   impact	  of	   the	   introduction	  of	  Oportunidades	  to	  urban	  areas	  on	  
informality.	  Since	  Oportunidades	  is	  means-­‐tested,	  workers	  may	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  work	  informally	  in	  
order	   to	  be	  able	   to	  more	  easily	  misreport	   their	   income	  and	  qualify	   for	   the	  program.	  This	  serves	  as	  an	  
additional	   robustness	   test	   for	   our	   results	   concerning	   Seguro	   Popular.	   Table	   4	   uses	   the	   same	  
specifications	  as	  in	  Table	  3	  and	  restricts	  the	  sample	  to	  municipalities	  with	  more	  than	  50,000	  inhabitants,	  
since	   this	   is	   the	   definition	   of	   “urban”	   for	   the	   roll-­‐out	   of	   Oportunidades.	  We	   do	   not	   find	   a	   significant	  
impact	  of	  Oportunidades	  on	  informality	  overall	  (columns	  1	  and	  2),	  just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Seguro	  Popular.	  
We	   do	   not	   find	   a	   significant	   impact	   of	   Oportunidades	   on	   informality	   for	   any	   of	   the	   subgroups	   in	   all	  
specifications	  with	  controls.	  Importantly,	  the	  results	  for	  Seguro	  Popular	  are	  unaffected	  by	  the	  inclusion	  
of	  a	  control	   for	  the	  existence	  of	  Oportunidades.	  Thus,	  using	  our	  preferred	  definition	  of	   informality	  we	  
find	  that	  Seguro	  Popular	  increased	  informality	  for	  less	  educated	  workers	  and	  that	  Oportunidades	  did	  not	  
affect	  informality.	  	  
How	  robust	  are	  these	  results	  to	  alternative	  measures	  of	  informality?	  Table	  5	  addresses	  this	  question.	  It	  
repeats	   the	   specification	   in	   Table	   4	   for	  workers	  with	   less	   than	   9	   years	   of	   education	   but	   using	   three	  
other	  definitions	  of	  informality:	  no	  written	  contract,	  self-­‐employed,	  and	  small	  firm.	  In	  columns	  1-­‐2,	  we	  
can	   see	   that	   SP	   increases	   informality	   as	   defined	   by	   “no	  written	   contract”,	   even	   though	  when	   adding	  
controls	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  Additionally,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  SP	  on	  informality	  
as	  defined	  by	  no	  written	  contract	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  effect	  when	  informality	  is	  defined	  as	  
no	   health	   insurance	   or	   self-­‐employed.	   This	   is	   not	   surprising	   since	   the	   correlation	   between	   the	   two	  
definitions	  of	  informality	  is	  0.8.	  When	  informal	  is	  defined	  as	  being	  self-­‐employed16	  or	  working	  for	  a	  small	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  We	  have	  also	  analyzed	  the	  impact	  of	  SP	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  occupations	  and	  industries	  and	  found	  no	  
significant	  effect.	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firm	   (less	   than	   5	   employees),	   SP	   does	   not	   affect	   informality,	   at	   least	   not	   when	   adding	   controls.	  
Additionally,	  the	  point	  estimates	  are	  very	  close	  to	  zero.	  Bosch	  and	  Campos-­‐Vazquez	  (2010)	  found	  that	  
formal	  employment	  in	  small	  firms	  grew	  less	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  SP.	  When	  looking	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  
SP	   on	   informality	   within	   small	   firms,	   we	   do	   not	   find	   any	   significant	   effect17,	   either	   for	   the	   whole	  
population	  or	  for	  workers	  with	  9	  years	  of	  schooling	  or	  less	  (results	  not	  shown).	  In	  fact,	  our	  estimate	  of	  
the	  impact	  of	  SP	  on	  informality	  for	  all	  workers	  in	  small	  firms	  is	  negative	  and	  the	  upper	  bound	  of	  the	  90%	  
confidence	   interval	   is	   0.1	   percentage	   point,	   ruling	   out	   any	   economically	   significant	   impact	   of	   SP	   on	  
informality	   in	   small	   firms.	   This	   suggests	   that	  any	   increase	   in	   informality	   that	   resulted	   from	  SP	  did	  not	  
occur	   through	   workers	   becoming	   self-­‐employed	   or	   working	   for	   very	   small	   firms	   and	   was	   also	   not	  
particularly	  concentrated	  in	  small	  firms.	  As	  for	  Oportunidades,	  consistent	  with	  our	  main	  results,	  we	  find	  
no	  effect	  of	  the	  program	  on	  informality	  when	  using	  these	  alternative	  measures	  and	  relevant	  controls.	  
The impact of Seguro Popular on Job Transitions 
As	   outlined	   above,	   if	   informality	   became	   more	   attractive	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   Seguro	  
Popular,	  we	  may	  expect	  to	  see	  more	  transitions	  to	  informality	  and	  fewer	  to	  formality.	  We	  analyze	  this	  
issue	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   transition	   probabilities	   of	   workers	   from	   formality	   to	   informality,	   from	   non	  
employed	   to	   informal,	   informal	   to	   formal,	   and	   non	   employed	   to	   formal.	   A	   transition	   is	   coded	   as	   a	  
change	   in	   labor	  market	   status	   from	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   interview	   to	   the	   next	   quarter,	   conditional	   on	  
being	   in	   the	   specified	   initial	   state.	   We	   restrict	   the	   data	   to	   the	   first	   two	   quarters	   observed	   for	   each	  
individual	   to	  minimize	   potential	   attrition	   bias.	   Additionally,	   we	   restrict	   the	   data	   to	  workers	   with	   less	  
than	  9	  years	  of	  schooling18,	  since	  no	  effect	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  was	  found	  on	  the	  informality	  status	  of	  the	  
general	  population.	   The	  analysis	   regresses	  an	   indicator	   variable	   for	   the	   transition	  on	   the	   indicator	   for	  
the	  presence	  of	  the	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  a	  set	  of	  controls.	  In	  Table	  6,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  Seguro	  Popular	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The difference in results for small firms between our paper and Bosch and Campos-Vazquez may be partly due to 
the fact that we only look at urban areas while Bosch and Campos-Vazquez examine rural areas as well. 
18	  We	  also	  performed	  the	  analysis	  for	  workers	  with	  less	  than	  9	  years	  of	  schooling	  and	  over	  34	  years	  of	  age	  and	  the	  
results	  were	  qualitatively	  the	  same.	  
	   24	  
no	  effect	  on	  any	  of	  these	  transition	  probabilities.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  formal	  to	  informal,	  the	  sign	  is	  positive	  
as	  the	  theory	  would	  suggest,	  but	  the	  magnitude	   is	  almost	  zero.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  non	  
employment	   to	   informality,	   the	   sign	   is	   positive	   and	   significant	   without	   controls,	   but	   the	   coefficient	  
becomes	   insignificant	  with	   controls.	   Note	   also	   that	   the	  magnitude	   of	   the	   effect	   is	   very	   small.	   Seguro	  
Popular	  has	  a	  negative	  but	  insignificant	  effect	  on	  the	  transition	  from	  informal	  to	  formal	  status	  and	  the	  
transition	   from	   non-­‐employment	   to	   a	   formal	   job19.	   The	   signs	   are	   thus	   consistent	  with	  what	   could	   be	  
expected	  from	  theory	  but	  the	  effect	   is	  both	  very	  small	  and	  statistically	   insignificant.	  We	  thus	  conclude	  
that	  Seguro	  Popular	  did	  not	  significantly	  affect	  transitions	  from	  and	  to	  informality	  for	  workers	  with	  less	  
than	  9	  years	  of	  schooling.	  
Seen	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   US	   literature,	   this	   result	   suggests	   that	   health	   insurance	   does	   not	  
affect	  labor	  mobility,	  and	  in	  particular	  that	  job	  lock	  is	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  prevalent	  in	  Mexico	  before	  
the	   introduction	  of	  SP.	  This	   result	   is	  particularly	  noteworthy	   in	   that	  Gruber	  and	  Madrian	   (1994)	   found	  
that	  health	  insurance	  continuation	  coverage	  mandates	  significantly	  decreased	  job	  lock.	  We	  have	  a	  much	  
bigger	  change	  in	  policy	  in	  that	  SP	  provides	  health	  insurance	  that	  is	  almost	  as	  extensive	  as	  conventional	  
insurance	  and	  yet	  essentially	  free	  of	  cost.	  Still,	  we	  do	  not	  find	  any	  impact	  on	  job	  flows.	  One	  may	  argue	  
that	  we	  find	  no	  effect	  because	  the	  conditions	  for	  job	  lock	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  Mexico	  prior	  to	  SP.	  Indeed,	  in	  
order	  for	  job	  lock	  to	  be	  an	  issue,	  firms	  must	  face	  different	  costs	  of	  providing	  health	  insurance.	  In	  Mexico,	  
health	   insurance	   is	   provided	   by	   employers	   through	   their	   contributions	   to	   IMSS	   (or	   other	   similar	  
institutions),	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  these	  contributions	  is	  the	  same	  for	  any	  firm	  wishing	  to	  join	  the	  system.	  
Hence	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  providing	  health	  insurance	  does	  not	  vary	  across	  firms.	  However,	  
in	   practice,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   cost	   does	   vary	   in	   that	   informal	   firms	  wishing	   to	   provide	   health	  
insurance	  to	  a	  marginal	  worker	  face	  more	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  contribution	  to	  IMSS.	  If	  an	  informal	  firm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  We	  also	  performed	  the	  transition	  analysis	  over	  a	  full	  year	  (5	  quarters).	  We	  then	  get	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  
of	  SP	  on	  transitions	  from	  informal	  to	  formal,	  and	  this	  coefficient	  remains	  significant	  when	  adding	  controls.	  All	  
other	  results	  are	  substantially	  unaffected	  when	  using	  the	  transitions	  over	  5	  quarters.	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pays	  the	  contribution	  to	   IMSS	  for	  a	  new	  worker,	   it	  must	  also	  pay	   for	   the	  other	  mandated	  benefits	   for	  
this	  worker	  (especially	  pension	  contributions),	  and	  it	  runs	  a	  higher	  risk	  of	  paying	  fines	  unless	  it	  also	  pays	  
all	  mandated	   benefits	   to	   all	   workers	   that	   it	   already	   employs.	   Paying	   health	   benefits	   to	   inframarginal	  
workers	  would	  not	  result	  in	  a	  cost	  increase	  if	  the	  firm	  could	  fully	  offset	  the	  cost	  by	  paying	  lower	  wages.	  
However,	   workers	   who	   chose	   to	   forego	   health	   insurance	   presumably	   value	   it	   below	   its	   cost,	   and	  
therefore	  the	  firm	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  fully	  offset	  the	  increased	  cost	  by	  decreasing	  wages.	  As	  a	  result,	  
it	   seems	   reasonable	   to	  assume	  that	   informal	   firms	   face	  a	  higher	  cost	  of	  providing	  health	   insurance	   to	  
marginal	  workers	  than	  formal	  firms.	  Hence	  job	  lock	  is	  theoretically	  possible	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  SP.	  If	  job	  
lock	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  SP,	  then	  the	  introduction	  of	  SP	  should	  drastically	  reduce	  it.	  However,	  
we	  do	  not	  find	  any	  evidence	  for	  an	  impact	  on	  SP	  on	  job	  flows,	  and	  we	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  job	  lock	  
was	  not	  a	  substantial	  problem	  in	  the	  Mexican	  labor	  market	  prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  SP.	  	  
The	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  Wages	  
The	   theory	   of	   compensating	  wage	  differentials	   predicts	   that,	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   Seguro	  
Popular,	   wages	   in	   the	   informal	   sector	   should	   have	   decreased	   since	   SP	   provides	   health	   benefits	   for	  
informal	  workers.	  However,	   the	   literature	  on	   compensating	  wage	  differentials	   for	   health	   insurance	   in	  
the	   US	   finds	   mixed	   results.	   It	   is	   therefore	   quite	   interesting	   to	   see	   what	   the	   Mexican	   case	   reveals,	  
especially	  since	  we	  can	  use	  a	  large	  policy	  change	  within	  a	  panel	  setting.	  
We	   analyzed	   the	   wages	   of	   both	   formal	   and	   informal	   workers	   who	   switch	   sectors	   from	   one	  
quarter	   to	   the	   next.	   This	   strategy	   was	   chosen	   to	   correct	   for	   time-­‐invariant	   unobserved	   individual	  
characteristics	  that	  are	  correlated	  with	  both	  the	  wage	  level	  and	  working	  in	  one	  sector	  or	  the	  other.	  It	  is	  
very	   important	   to	  correct	   for	  such	  characteristics	  since	   informal	  workers	  are	  already	  very	  different	  on	  
observables	  from	  formal	  workers	  and	  are	  therefore	  very	  likely	  to	  differ	  on	  unobservables	  as	  well.	  Table	  
1	   describes	   these	   differences:	   Panel	   A	   show	   the	   entire	   sample,	   Panel	   B	   show	   the	   characteristics	   for	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workers	   in	   the	   formal	   sector	   and	   Panel	   C	   for	   those	   working	   in	   the	   informal	   sector.	   As	   we	   can	   see,	  
workers	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  are	  older,	  have	  more	  children,	  and	  have	  less	  years	  of	  schooling.	  Similarly	  
to	  the	  transition	  analysis,	  we	  only	  retain	  the	  first	  two	  quarters20	  of	  observation	  for	  each	  worker	  and	  we	  
focus	  on	  workers	  with	  9	  years	  of	  schooling	  or	   less21.	  The	  results	  are	  described	   in	  Table	  7.	  We	  can	  see	  
that	   Seguro	   Popular	   has	   no	   significant	   impact	   on	  wage	   changes	   for	  workers	  who	  move	   between	   the	  
formal	  and	   the	   informal	   sectors.	   This	   suggests	   that	  workers	  at	   the	  margin	  of	   informality	  do	  not	  value	  
health	  benefits	  much.	  These	  results	  also	  show	  no	  evidence	  for	  compensating	  wage	  differentials.	  	  
One	  problem	  in	  interpreting	  the	  results	  is	  that	  the	  labor	  market	  in	  Mexico	  may	  be	  segmented.	  If	  
formal	   sector	   jobs	   pay	   above	  market-­‐clearing	  wages,	   then	   the	   compensating	  wage	   differential	  model	  
need	  not	  hold.	  However,	  as	  pointed	  out	  above,	  self-­‐employed	  workers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  
the	   formal	   labor	   market	   in	   Mexico.	   The	   results	   in	   Table	   7	   are	   qualitatively	   similar	   if	   we	   focus	   on	  
transitions	  between	  formal	  employment	  and	  self-­‐employment	  for	  workers	  with	  9	  years	  of	  education	  or	  
fewer.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  effect	  of	  SP	  on	  the	  wage	  gains	  of	  workers	  moving	  between	  
formal	  and	  informal	  jobs	  is	  not	  driven	  by	  labor	  market	  segmentation.	  	  
If	  marginal	  workers	  do	  not	  value	  health	  insurance,	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  SP	  to	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  job	  
mobility.	  If	  health	  benefits	  are	  not	  valued,	  workers	  will	  not	  remain	  “stuck”	  in	  a	  less	  productive	  job	  just	  
because	  it	  provides	  health	  benefits.	  In	  other	  words,	  job	  lock	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  problem.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  
our	  results	  suggest	  that	  some	  workers	  may	  remain	  informal	  because	  they	  value	  health	  benefits	  at	   less	  
than	  their	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  payroll	  taxes.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Results	  are	  substantially	  unaffected	  when	  analyzing	  job	  changes	  over	  a	  full	  year	  (5	  quarters).	  
21	  Once	  again,	  we	  performed	  the	  analysis	  for	  workers	  with	  less	  than	  9	  years	  of	  schooling	  and	  over	  34	  years	  of	  age	  
and	  the	  results	  were	  substantially	  the	  same.	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Conclusion	  	  
This	  paper	  has	  analyzed	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  social	  protection	  system	  in	  Mexican	  urban	  
areas	  on	  informality.	  This	  includes	  the	  System	  of	  Social	  Protection	  in	  Health	  through	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  
Oportunidades.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  both	  components	  on	  informality	  is	  close	  to	  zero	  and	  
insignificant.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   expansion	   of	   these	   social	   protection	   programs	   had	   a	   negligible	  
distortionary	   impact	   on	   labor	   supply.	   Given	   the	   well-­‐documented	   benefits	   of	   these	   programs,	   the	  
findings	  of	  this	  paper	  suggest	  that	  these	  programs	  are	  welfare-­‐improving.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  find	  that	  
Oportunidades	  does	  not	  significantly	  increase	  informality	  for	  any	  demographic	  group	  we	  examined.	  The	  
absence	  of	  an	  effect	   is	  most	   likely	  explained	  by	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  roll-­‐out	  for	  this	  program.	  As	  for	  
Seguro	  Popular,	  we	  find	  that	  it	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  informality	  among	  workers	  
with	  less	  than	  nine	  years	  of	  schooling,	  and,	  among	  this	  group,	  the	  increase	  in	  informality	  was	  larger	  for	  
workers	  who	  are	  either	  married	  heads	  of	  household	  with	  kids	  or	  above	  34	  years	  old.	  Even	  among	  these	  
groups,	   the	   size	   of	   the	   impact	   remains	   small,	   as	   it	   is	   always	   less	   than	   2	   percentage	   points22.	   For	   all	  
workers	  with	  9	  years	  of	  education	  or	   less,	  Seguro	  Popular	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  0.9	  percentage	  point	  
increase	  in	  informality.	  Additionally,	  we	  find	  no	  effect	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  transitions	  between	  formal	  
and	   informal	   jobs	   or	   on	  wage	   gains	   of	   job	  movers.	   These	   findings	   contribute	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   the	  
impact	   of	   health	   insurance	   provision	   on	   labor	  mobility	   and	  wages,	   a	   literature	  which	   presents	  mixed	  
results	   for	   the	  US	   context.	  We	   find	   that	  extending	  health	   insurance	   coverage	  does	  not	   increase	   labor	  
mobility	  nor	  does	  it	  impact	  the	  wages	  of	  marginal	  workers	  in	  Mexico.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Colombia has also extended the coverage of health insurance to poor uninsured households and a recent working 
paper shows that informality increased as a result of this policy (Camacho et al., 2009). The increase in informality 
seems somewhat higher in Colombia than in Mexico, and it would be interesting to further examine why this is so. 
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With	   respect	   to	   informality	   in	  developing	   countries,	   our	   results	   suggest	   that	  marginal	  workers	  do	  not	  
choose	  to	  work	  formally	  or	  informally	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  health	  benefits.	  Since	  we	  also	  do	  
not	  find	  any	  effect	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  the	  wages	  of	  workers	  who	  move	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  the	  
informal	   sectors,	   we	   speculate	   that	  marginal	   workers	  may	   not	   value	   the	   health	   benefits	   provided	   in	  
formal	   jobs	   as	   much	   as	   these	   benefits	   cost	   employers	   in	   payroll	   taxes.	   If	   so,	   then	   mandating	   the	  
payment	  of	  payroll	   taxes	   for	  health	  coverage	  of	   less	  educated	  workers	  could	  be	  partly	   responsible	   for	  
high	   informality	   in	   this	  group.	  This	  does	  not	   imply	   that	   less	  educated	  workers	  should	  not	  be	  provided	  
health	   benefits,	   but	   rather	   that	   payroll	   taxes	   may	   not	   be	   the	   best	   way	   of	   financing	   these	   benefits.	  
Overall,	  we	  conclude	  that	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  Oportunidades	  did	  not	  significantly	  increase	  distortions	  in	  
urban	   labor	  markets,	   but	   that	   financing	   health	   insurance	   through	   compulsory	   payroll	   taxes	  may	  well	  
increase	  informality	  as	  workers	  are	  unwilling	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  benefit	  they	  value	  at	  less	  than	  its	  cost.	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A.	  All	  Sample	  
Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
No	  Health	  Services	  or	  self-­‐
employed	   951,354	   	  0.5044	  	   	  0.5000	  	   0	   1	  
Salaried	  and	  no	  health	  services	   951,354	   	  0.3327	  	   	  0.4712	  	   0	   1	  
Self-­‐employed	   951,302	   	  0.1717	  	   	  0.3771	  	   0	   1	  
No	  contract	  	   696,473	   	  0.3528	  	   	  0.4778	  	   0	   1	  
Small	  firm	  (<	  employees)	   941,317	   	  0.4238	  	   	  0.4942	  	   0	   1	  
Gender	  (Male=1)	   951,354	   	  0.6039	  	   	  0.4891	  	   0	   1	  
Age	   951,354	   	  35.7225	  	   	  12.3681	  	   15	   69	  
Married	   951,354	   	  0.5219	  	   	  0.4995	  	   0	   1	  
Years	  of	  Schooling	  	   950,690	   	  10.1115	  	   	  4.8546	  	   0	   24	  
Children	  in	  Household	   951,354	   	  5.0493	  	   	  8.1611	  	   0	   116	  
Electricity	  growth	  in	  municipality	  	   837,580	   	  0.7409	  	   	  23.5294	  	   -­‐0.99	   1075.32	  
Hospitals	  per	  capita	   939,112	   	  0.0001	  	   	  0.0001	  	   0	   0.0018	  
Economic	  Sector	  (Distribution	  of	  workers)*	  
	   	   	   	  Construction	   951,354	   	  0.1866	  	   	  0.3896	  	   0	   1	  
	  	  Manufacture	   951,354	   	  0.2183	  	   	  0.4131	  	   0	   1	  
	  	  	  	  	  Commerce	   951,354	   	  0.4590	  	   	  0.4983	  	   0	   1	  
	  	  	  	  	  Services	   951,354	   	  0.0492	  	   	  0.2162	  	   0	   1	  
Not	  specified	  	  	   951,354	   	  0.0014	  	   	  0.0380	  	   0	   1	  
	  
B.	  Formal	  Workers	  (No	  health	  services	  or	  self-­‐employed	  equals	  zero)	  
Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
Gender	  (Male=1)	   471,525	   	  0.6107	  	   	  0.4876	  	   0	   1	  
Age	   471,525	   	  34.8398	  	   	  11.0855	  	   15	   69	  
Married	   471,525	   	  0.5425	  	   	  0.4982	  	   0	   1	  
Years	  of	  Schooling	  	   471,231	   	  11.3094	  	   	  4.6690	  	   0	   24	  
Children	  in	  Household	   471,525	   	  4.8835	  	   	  7.7397	  	   0.0000	   116.0000	  
Electricity	  growth	  in	  municipality	  	   415,695	   	  0.6879	  	   	  22.9120	  	   -­‐1	   1075.3170	  
Hospitals	  per	  capita	   466,545	   	  0.0001	  	   	  0.0001	  	   0	   0.0018387	  
Economic	  Sector	  (Distribution	  of	  workers)*	   	   	   	   	  
Construction	   471,525	   	  0.2503	  	   	  0.4332	  	   0	   1	  
	  	  Manufacture	   471,525	   	  0.1667	  	   	  0.3727	  	   0	   1	  
	  	  	  	  	  Commerce	   471,525	   	  0.4593	  	   	  0.4983	  	   0.0000	   1.0000	  
	  	  	  	  	  Services	   471,525	   	  0.0753	  	   	  0.2639	  	   0	   1.0000	  
Not	  specified	  	  	   471,525	   0.0003075	   0.0175334	   0	   1	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C.	  Informal	  Workers	  	  
Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
Gender	  (Male=1)	   479,829	   	  0.5972	  	   	  0.4905	  	   0	   1	  
Age	   479,829	   	  36.5900	  	   	  13.4541	  	   15	   69	  
Married	   479,829	   	  0.5017	  	   	  0.5000	  	   0	   1	  
Years	  of	  Schooling	  	   479,459	   	  8.9342	  	   	  4.7443	  	   0	   24	  
Children	  in	  Household	   479,829	   	  5.2123	  	   	  8.5519	  	   0.0000	   110.0000	  
Electricity	  growth	  in	  municipality	  	   421,885	   	  0.7932	  	   	  24.1223	  	   -­‐1	   1075.3170	  
Hospitals	  per	  capita	   472,567	   	  0.0001	  	   	  0.0001	  	   0	   0.0018387	  
Economic	  Sector	  (Distribution	  of	  workers)	   	   	   	   	  
Construction	   479,829	   	  0.1239	  	   	  0.3295	  	   0	   1	  
	  	  Manufacture	   479,829	   	  0.2690	  	   	  0.4434	  	   0	   1	  
	  	  	  	  	  Commerce	   479,829	   	  0.4586	  	   	  0.4983	  	   0.0000	   1.0000	  
	  	  	  	  	  Services	   479,829	   	  0.0235	  	   	  0.1514	  	   0	   1.0000	  
Not	  specified	  	  	   479,829	   0.0025676	   0.0506063	   0	   1	  
	  
Sources:	  
-­‐	  	  Seguro	  Popular.	  Comision	  Nacional	  de	  Proteccion	  Social	  en	  Salud.	  Annual	  information	  by	  village	  collapsed	  by	  non-­‐rural	  units	  in	  
the	  by	  municipality	  
-­‐	  Oportunidades.	  Coordinacion	  Nacional	  de	  Oportunidades.	  Annual	  information	  by	  village	  collapsed	  by	  non-­‐rural	  units	  in	  the	  
municipality	  
-­‐	  Employment	  and	  sociodemographic	  variables.	  Authors'	  estimations	  using	  ENE	  (1995-­‐2004)	  and	  ENOE	  (2005-­‐2009)	  
*	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  economic	  sector	  of	  the	  job	  where	  the	  employee	  is	  working	  at	  
	  
	   	  
	   35	  
Table	  2	  
Endogeneity	  Analysis.	  Informality	  as	  Predictor	  of	  Year	  of	  Introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular.	  
Analysis	  by	  Municipality	  
VARIABLES	  













SP	  in	  2004	  
or	  later	  /B	  
SP	  in	  2004	  
or	  later/B	  
SP	  in	  2004	  
or	  later/B	  
SP	  in	  2004	  or	  
later/B	  
Informality/1	   1.223*	   1.232*	   0.974	   0.154	   0.269	   0.348	   0.086	   0.108	  
[0.674]	   [0.686]	   [0.915]	   [0.785]	   [0.220]	   [0.225]	   [0.292]	   [0.231]	  
Log	  Total	  Pop	  
Municipality	  
	   	   -­‐0.230*	   -­‐0.204*	   	   	   -­‐0.098**	   -­‐0.034	  
	   	   [0.127]	   [0.112]	   	   	   [0.040]	   [0.033]	  
Doctors	  Per	  
Capita	  
	   	   -­‐163.359	   -­‐210.418*	   	   	   -­‐52.342	   -­‐91.077**	  
	   	   [139.385]	   [123.471]	   	   	   [44.453]	   [36.321]	  
Hospitals	  Per	  
Capita	  
	   	   -­‐5,284.214	   35,155.537	   	   	   2,477.716	   7,974.162	  
	   	   [33,150.889]	   [28,649.062]	   	   	   [10,572.511]	   [8,427.628]	  
Percent	  No	  
Electricity	  
	   	   -­‐3.503	   -­‐0.537	   	   	   -­‐0.764	   0.529	  
	   	   [3.252]	   [2.766]	   	   	   [1.037]	   [0.814]	  
Log	  GDP	  per	  
capita	  
	   	   0.189	   0.332	   	   	   0.080	   0.083	  
	   	   [0.322]	   [0.298]	   	   	   [0.103]	   [0.088]	  
Gender	   	   	   -­‐4.376	   -­‐4.790**	   	   	   -­‐0.930	   -­‐0.827	  
	   	   [2.857]	   [2.288]	   	   	   [0.911]	   [0.673]	  
Age	  	   	   	   0.056	   -­‐0.015	   	   	   0.025	   -­‐0.000	  
	   	   [0.062]	   [0.048]	   	   	   [0.020]	   [0.014]	  
Years	  of	  
Schooling	  
	   	   0.081	   0.174*	   	   	   -­‐0.007	   0.047*	  
	   	   [0.113]	   [0.088]	   	   	   [0.036]	   [0.026]	  
Log	  Population	  
State	  
	   0.392***	   	   	   	   0.081*	   	   	  
	   [0.131]	   	   	   	   [0.043]	   	   	  
Governor	  PAN	   	   -­‐0.039	   	   	   	   0.005	   	   	  
	   [0.246]	   	   	   	   [0.081]	   	   	  
Governor	  PRD	   	   -­‐0.360	   	   	   	   -­‐0.247**	   	   	  
	   [0.343]	   	   	   	   [0.112]	   	   	  
Constant	   1.075***	   -­‐4.740**	   2.335	   3.166	   0.43452***	   -­‐0.801	   0.727	   0.441	  
[0.385]	   [1.962]	   [3.922]	   [3.509]	   [0.126]	   [0.642]	   [1.251]	   [1.032]	  
State	  FE	   NO	   NO	   NO	   YES	   NO	  	   NO	   NO	   YES	  
Observations	   211	   211	   195	   195	   211	   211	   195	   195	  
R-­‐squared	   0.016	   0.068	   0.066	   0.589	   0.007	   0.054	   0.064	   0.650	  
Standard	  errors	  in	  brackets	  and	  clustered	  .	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  	  
Notes:	  A/	  Dependent	  variable	  indicates	  the	  year	  of	  introduction	  of	  SP.	  	  
B/	  Dependent	  variable	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  zero	  if	  the	  municipality	  was	  covered	  before	  2004,	  and	  equal	  to	  one	  if	  it	  was	  covered	  after	  this	  year.	  	  
Coefficients	  show	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  variable	  in	  explaining	  if	  the	  municipality	  is	  covered	  by	  Popular	  during	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  its	  functioning.	  OLS	  regressions.	  
NHSE:	  No	  health	  services	  or	  self-­‐employed.	  
Sources:	  	  1	  INEGI,	  Employment	  surveys	  1995-­‐2009/	  
2/	  CONAPO,	  Mexican	  Population	  Council,	  Population	  estimates	  
3/INEGI,	  Annual	  State	  	  Yearbooks	  1995-­‐2009	  
4/	  CONAPO,	  Mexican	  Population	  Council,	  Marginalization	  Indexes	  5/	  Center	  of	  Research	  for	  Development.	  Annual	  election	  is	  in	  Mexico	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Table	  3	  









Married,	  Schooling	  <=	  9	  
yrs,	  	  with	  children	  
Sample	  5	  
Schooling<=9,	  Age>34	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	   (9)	   (10)	  
Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	  
Ind.	  SP	   -­‐0.004	   0.008	   0.03756***	   0.00858*	   -­‐0.00953**	   0.009	   0.007*	   0.012*	   0.021***	   0.014***	  
	   [0.00363]	   [0.006]	   [0.00323]	   [0.005]	   [0.004]	   [0.006]	   [0.004]	   [0.006]	   [0.003]	   [0.005]	  
Schooling	   	   -­‐0.021***	   	   -­‐0.029***	   	   -­‐0.013***	   	   -­‐0.020***	   	   -­‐0.016***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.00054]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	  
Age	   	   -­‐0.019***	   	   -­‐0.017***	   	   -­‐0.017***	   	   -­‐0.003***	   	   -­‐0.015***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.002]	  
Age2	   	   0.001***	   	   0.001***	   	   0.001***	   	   0.001***	   	   0.001***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Male	   	   -­‐0.020***	   	   -­‐0.080***	   	   0.000	   	   0.000	   	   -­‐0.136***	  
	   	   [0.005]	   	   [0.007]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.007]	  
Married	   	   -­‐0.019***	   	   -­‐0.011***	   	   -­‐0.085***	   	   0.000	   	   0.001	  
	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.003]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.002]	  
Children	   	   0.003***	   	   0.003***	   	   0.002***	   	   0.002***	   	   0.001***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Electricity	  Growth	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0001**	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Constant	   0.519***	   0.832***	   0.582***	   0.853***	   0.515***	   0.74***	   0.531***	   0.880***	   0.698***	   1.367***	  
	   [0.0019]	   [0.028]	   [0.002]	   [0.031]	   [0.002]	   [0.028]	   [0.002]	   [0.047]	   [0.001]	   [0.047]	  
Economic	  Sector	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Year	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Observations	   1043323	   898682	   608788	   518014	   630167	   540996	   179873	   152016	   214505	   183234	  
Number	  of	  municipalities	   350	   318	   350	   318	   350	   318	   350	   317	   350	   318	  
R-­‐squared	   0.000	   0.123	   0.001	   0.125	   0.000	   0.116	   0.000	   0.124	   0.000	   0.113	  
*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	  	  
Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipality	  
Notes:	  Linear	  probability	  model.	  Informal	  is	  self-­‐employed	  or	  no	  health	  benefits	  through	  the	  employer.	  	  
Informality	  is	  measured	  as	  no	  health	  services	  or	  self-­‐employed	  
Source:	  Authors’	  estimations	  using	  ENE	  (1995-­‐2004)	  and	  ENOE	  (2005-­‐2009)	  
i
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Figure	  1	  
Informality	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  
	  
	  
Notes:	  Coefficients	  on	  relative	  year	  estimated	  from	  a	  linear	  probability	  model,	  with	  controls	  for	  sector,	  age,	  age	  squared,	  gender,	  
years	  of	  schooling,	  log	  population,	  electricity	  growth,	  year	  and	  municipality	  fixed	  effects.	  The	  sample	  is	  restricted	  to	  workers	  with	  9	  
years	  of	  schooling	  or	  less.	  Informal	  is	  self-­‐employed	  or	  no	  health	  benefits	  through	  the	  employer.	  Data	  from	  years	  prior	  to	  4	  years	  
before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  more	  than	  2	  years	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  program	  is	  not	  used.	  Balanced	  panel	  





















-4 -2 0 2
Relative Period of Introduction
Source:  Author's estimation using labor surveys 1995-2009.
No Health or Self-employed. All Population with less than 9 yrs Schooling
Seguro Popular and its Effect on Informality.
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Table	  4	  









Married,	  Schooling	  <=9	  
yrs,	  	  with	  children	  
Sample	  5	  
Schooling<=9,	  Age>34	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	   (7)	   (8)	   (9)	   (10)	  
Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	   Informal	  
Indicator	  SP	   -­‐0.003	   0.008	   0.033***	   0.010**	   -­‐0.009**	   0.009	   0.007	   0.013**	   0.021***	   0.019***	  
	   [0.004]	   [0.006]	   [0.004]	   [0.005]	   [0.004]	   [0.006]	   [0.005]	   [0.006]	   [0.004]	   [0.005]	  
Indicator	  	  Oportunidades	   -­‐0.001	   0.006	   0.007**	   -­‐0.008	   0.001	   0.011	   0.001	   0.010	   0.003	   -­‐0.002	  
	   [0.004]	   [0.010]	   [0.003]	   [0.010]	   [0.004]	   [0.011]	   [0.005]	   [0.012]	   [0.004]	   [0.001]	  
Gender	   	   -­‐0.015***	   	   -­‐0.080***	   	   0.00000	   	   0.000	   	   -­‐0.133***	  
	   	   [0.006]	   	   [0.008]	   	   [0.00000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.008]	  
Age	   	   -­‐0.019***	   	   -­‐0.017***	   	   -­‐0.022***	   	   -­‐0.003**	   	   -­‐0.017***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001	   	   [0.002]	  
Age2	   	   0.001***	   	   0.000***	   	   0.000***	   	   0.000***	   	   0.000***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Schooling	   	   -­‐0.021***	   	   -­‐0.030***	   	   -­‐0.014***	   	   -­‐0.020***	   	   -­‐0.017***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.001]	  
Children	   	   -­‐0.001***	   	   0.000	   	   -­‐0.000	   	   0.000***	   	   -­‐0.000	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Ln	  population	   	   0.010	   	   -­‐0.062	   	   -­‐0.004	   	   -­‐0.076	   	   -­‐0.094**	  
	   	   [0.063]	   	   [0.044]	   	   [0.065]	   	   [0.052]	   	   [0.041]	  
Electricity	  Growth	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0001***	   	   -­‐0.0000	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.00001]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Hospitals	  per	  capita	   	   -­‐152.523	   	   -­‐121.545**	   	   -­‐163.725*	   	   -­‐130.077*	   	   -­‐93.690*	  
	   	   [93.417]	   	   [53.23561]	   	   [91.939]	   	   [76.860]	   	   [48.649]	  
Constant	   0.506***	   0.684	   0.565***	   1.692***	   0.503***	   0.811	   0.518***	   1.816***	   0.684***	   2.019***	  
	   [0.003]	   [0.818]	   [0.002]	   [0.579]	   [0.003]	   [0.841]	   [0.003]	   [0.680]	   [0.002]	   [0.555]	  
Sector	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Year	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Observations	   951354	   826862	   545851	   470203	   574529	   497890	   161312	   138222	   191168	   165507	  
Number	  of	  municipalities	   160	   148	   160	   148	   160	   148	   160	   147	   160	   148	  
R-­‐squared	   0.000	   0.121	   0.001	   0.125	   0.000	   0.110	   0.000	   0.123	   0.001	   0.113	  
*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	  	  
Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipality	  
Notes:	  Linear	  probability	  model.	  Informal	  is	  self-­‐employed	  or	  no	  health	  benefits	  through	  the	  employer	  	  
Source:	  Authors’	  estimations	  using	  ENE	  (1995-­‐2004)	  and	  ENOE	  (2005-­‐2009)	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Table	  5	  
	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  Oportunidades	  on	  alternative	  measures	  of	  informality	  	  
COEFFICIENT	  
No	  Contract	  
(Schooling	  <=9	  years)	  
Self-­‐Employed	  
(Schooling	  <=9	  years)	  
Small	  Firm	  
(<	  5	  employees,	  Schooling	  
<=9	  years)	  
(1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
Indicator	  SP	   0.070***	   0.016	   0.003	   0.001	   0.041***	   -­‐0.000	  
	   [0.007]	   [0.010]	   [0.002]	   [0.003]	   [0.004]	   [0.004]	  
Ind.	  	  Oportunidades	   -­‐0.002	   0.009	   0.008***	   0.001	   0.014***	   -­‐0.006	  
	   [0.005]	   [0.028]	   [0.002]	   [0.003]	   [0.003]	   [0.005]	  
Schooling	   	   -­‐0.040***	   	   -­‐0.011***	   	   -­‐0.028***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.001]	  
Age	   	   -­‐0.026***	   	   0.011***	   	   -­‐0.008***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Age2	   	   0.000***	   	   -­‐0.000***	   	   0.000***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Male	   	   -­‐0.049***	   	   -­‐0.024***	   	   -­‐0.099***	  
	   	   [0.007]	   	   [0.005]	   	   [0.006]	  
Married	   	   -­‐0.063***	   	   0.017***	   	   -­‐0.000	  
	   	   [0.003]	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.002]	  
Children	   	   0.003***	   	   0.001***	   	   0.007***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Electricity	  Growth	   	   -­‐0.000	   	   -­‐0.000***	   	   -­‐0.000***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.00001]	   	   [0.000]	  
Constant	   0.441***	   1.170***	   0.208***	   -­‐0.209***	   0.500***	   0.461***	  
	   [0.004]	   [0.030]	   [0.001]	   [0.01110]	   [0.002]	   [0.019]	  
Sector	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Yea	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Observations	   424227	   361940	   609990	   519115	   604540	   514329	  
Number	  of	  municipalities	   350	   318	   350	   318	   350	   318	  
R-­‐squared	   0.004	   0.156	   0.000	   0.115	   0.002	   0.149	  
*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%	  	  
Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipality	  
Notes:	  Linear	  probability	  model.	  Informal	  is	  self-­‐employed	  or	  no	  health	  benefits	  through	  the	  employer	  
Source:	  Authors’	  estimations	  using	  ENE	  (1995-­‐2004)	  and	  ENOE	  (2005-­‐2009)	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Table	  6	  
	  Transition	  Probabilities	  Between	  Formality,	  Informality	  and	  Non-­‐employment	  	  
COEFFICIENT	  





























Ind.	  SP	   0.003	   0.002	   0.006*	   0.002	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.003	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.009	  
	   [0.004]	   [0.004]	   [0.003]	   [0.002]	   [0.002]	   [0.003]	   [0.002]	   [0.002]	  
Schooling	   	   -­‐0.010***	   	   -­‐0.018***	   	   0.004***	   	   0.018***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.001]	  
Age	   	   -­‐0.008***	   	   -­‐0.004***	   	   -­‐0.001***	   	   0.004***	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Age2	   	   0.000***	   	   0.000***	   	   0.000	   	   -­‐0.000***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Male	   	   0.013***	   	   -­‐0.034***	   	   0.019***	   	   0.034***	  
	   	   [0.003]	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.003]	  
Married	   	   -­‐0.026***	   	   -­‐0.004***	   	   -­‐0.010***	   	   0.00374***	  
	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.001]	  
Children	   	   0.000***	   	   0.000***	   	   -­‐0.000	   	   -­‐0.000***	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Electricity	  Growth	   	   0.001*	   	   -­‐0.000**	   	   -­‐0.000**	   	   0.000**	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Constant	   0.112***	   0.165***	   0.170***	   0.050***	   0.086***	   0.047***	   0.110***	   -­‐0.048***	  
	   [0.003]	   [0.016]	   [0.00196]	   [0.004]	   [0.00184]	   [0.006]	   [0.002]	   [0.004]	  
Economic	  Sector	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Year	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
Observations	   158744	   142488	   568140	   508924	   240526	   215899	   568140	   508924	  
Number	  of	  
municipalities	   332	   302	   332	   304	   332	   303	   332	   304	  
R-­‐squared	   0.000	   0.094	   0.014	   0.663	   0.001	   0.050	   0.022	   0.346	  
Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipality	  in	  brackets	  
***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  
Notes:	  Linear	  probability	  model.	  Informal	  is	  self-­‐employed	  or	  no	  health	  benefits	  through	  the	  employer	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Table	  7	  
	  Wage	  Differentials	  from	  Switching	  Jobs	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Sectors	  	  
COEFFICIENT	  

















	   	   	   	   	  
Indicator	  SP	   -­‐0.012	   -­‐0.016	   -­‐0.012	   -­‐0.010	  
	   [0.014]	   [0.016]	   [0.019]	   [0.020]	  
Schooling	   	   -­‐0.002	   	   -­‐0.006**	  
	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.002]	  
Age	   	   0.004*	   	   -­‐0.006***	  
	   	   [0.002]	   	   [0.002]	  
Age2	   	   -­‐0.000*	   	   0.000**	  
	   	   [0.000]	   	   [0.000]	  
Male	   	   0.021	   	   -­‐0.034***	  
	   	   [0.016]	   	   [0.010]	  
Married	   	   0.011	   	   -­‐0.060***	  
	   	   [0.010]	   	   [0.011]	  
Children	   	   -­‐0.000	   	   0.000	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.000]	  
Electricity	  Growth	   	   -­‐0.001	   	   -­‐0.005**	  
	   	   [0.001]	   	   [0.002]	  
Constant	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.071*	   0.021*	   0.268***	  
	   [0.012]	   [0.042]	   [0.012]	   [0.047]	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Economic	  Sector	  FE	   NO	   YES	   NO	   YES	  
Year	  FE	   YES	   YES	   YES	   YES	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Observations	   14668	   13279	   15085	   13700	  
Number	  of	  municipalities	   300	   266	   307	   274	  
R-­‐squared	   0.001	   0.004	   0.000	   0.008	  
Standard	  errors	  clustered	  by	  municipality	  in	  brackets	  
***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  





	   	  
	   42	  
Figure	  2	  
	  Total	  Dwellings	  Covered	  Seguro	  Popular	  by	  Year	  (Millions)	  
	  




	  Geographical	  Coverage	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  in	  2009,	  in	  percentage	  of	  population	  
	  
Source:	  CNPSS	  (2009)	  
	  
	   	  
% of Dwellings 
covered by State
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APPENDIX	  1:	  further	  results	  
Figure	  4	  
The	  timing	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  on	  informality,	  up	  to	  5	  years	  after	  introduction	  
	  
Notes:	  Coefficients	  on	  relative	  year	  estimated	  from	  a	  linear	  probability	  model,	  with	  controls	  for	  sector,	  age,	  age	  squared,	  
gender,	  years	  of	  schooling,	  log	  population,	  electricity	  growth,	  year	  and	  municipality	  fixed	  effects.	  The	  sample	  is	  restricted	  to	  
workers	  with	  9	  years	  of	  schooling	  or	  less.	  Informal	  is	  self-­‐employed	  or	  no	  health	  benefits	  through	  the	  employer.	  Data	  from	  
years	  prior	  to	  4	  years	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  more	  than	  4	  years	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  program	  is	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Figure	  5	  




Notes:	  Coefficients	  on	  relative	  year	  estimated	  from	  a	  linear	  probability	  model,	  with	  controls	  for	  sector,	  age,	  age	  squared,	  
gender,	  years	  of	  schooling,	  log	  population,	  electricity	  growth,	  year	  and	  municipality	  fixed	  effects.	  The	  sample	  is	  restricted	  to	  
workers	  with	  9	  years	  of	  schooling	  or	  less.	  Informal	  is	  self-­‐employed	  or	  no	  health	  benefits	  through	  the	  employer.	  Data	  from	  
years	  prior	  to	  4	  years	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  more	  than	  2	  years	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  program	  is	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APPENDIX	  2:	  Contributions	  to	  Social	  Security	  
	  
Insurance	   Contribution*	   Employer	  
	  (%	  of	  total)	  
Employee	  
(%	  of	  total)	  
Government	  	  
(%	  of	  total)	  
Retirement	   6.5	   70	   25	   5	  
Life	  and	  disability	   4	   70	   25	   5	  
Health	  and	  
Maternity	  	   12.5	  
100	   	  	   	  	  
Workers	  
compensation	   2.5	  
100	   	  	   	  	  
Child	  Care	   1	   100	   	  	   	  	  
Housing	   5	   100	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Total	   31.5	   90	   8.3	   1.7	  
Source:	  Law	  of	  Social	  Security.	  Estimates	  using	  the	  average	  wage.	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APPENDIX	  3:	  Institutional	  background	  on	  Seguro	  Popular	  and	  
Oportunidades	  
Seguro	  Popular	   represents	  the	   largest	  effort	   in	  Mexico	  to	  extend	  coverage	  of	  health	  services	  since	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Secretaría	  de	  Salud	  (SS)	  and	  Instituto	  Mexicano	  del	  Seguro	  Social	  (IMSS,	  the	  provider	  of	  
social	  security	  for	  formal	  workers	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  their	  families)	  in	  1943.	  	  	  
Seguro	  Popular	  has	  in	  principle	  a	  progressive	  premium.	  Individuals	  in	  the	  first	  two	  deciles	  of	  income	  
(before	  2010)	  and	  four	  deciles	  of	  income	  (before	  2010)	  are	  exempt	  from	  payment,	  and	  the	  premium	  
increases	  with	  income	  level	  for	  the	  other	  deciles.	  
According	  to	  the	  current	  rules,	  the	  federal	  government	  funds	  83%	  of	  total	  annual	  cost	  of	  the	  insurance	  
of	  every	  affiliate	  while	  state	  governments	  pay	  the	  remaining	  17%	  and	  bears	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  
infrastructure	   of	   health	   services.	   The	   total	   number	   of	   beneficiaries	   in	   the	   program	   and	   the	  
corresponding	  funds	  to	  the	  states	   is	  defined	  by	  the	  federal	  and	  state	  governments.	  Once	  the	  target	  of	  
affiliation	   is	   set,	   states,	   the	   health	   local	   authorities	   define	   the	   affiliation	   process.	   This	   set	   of	   rules	   for	  
affiliation	  must	   comply	  with	   a	   statistical	   procedure	   similar	   to	   the	   one	   used	   in	  Oportunidades:	   	   every	  
covered	   dwelling	   must	   be	   identified	   and	   classified	   into	   income	   deciles	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   the	  
contributory	  category	  to	  which	  they	  belong.	  This	  is	  done	  using	  a	  discriminant	  analysis	  model	  provided	  by	  
the	   Comisión	   Nacional	   de	   Protección	   Social	   en	   Salud	   (CNPSS).	   There	   are	   some	   exceptions	   to	   this	  
protocol,	   and	   federal	   and	   state	   governments	   can	   determine	   the	   affiliation	   of	   dwellings	   without	   the	  
classification.23	   Seguro	   Popular	   has	   been	   introduced	   in	   all	   31	   states	   and	   Distrito	   Federal.	   Total	  
expenditure	   and	   coverage	   differ	   widely	   among	   states	   (Figure	   3	   and	   Figure	   6),	   and	   the	   observed	  
differences	  are	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  compensatory	  objective	  of	  converging	  towards	  equal	  spending	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  rules	  allow	  for	  collective	  affiliations	  of	  specific	  groups.	  These	  may	  be	  negotiated	  by	  unions,	  production	  
organizations	  or	  any	  other	  NGO	  or	  government	  agencies.	  See	  Scott	  (2006) 
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per	  capita	  across	  states.	  Up	  to	  2011,	  the	  SP	  package	  includes	  275	  medical	  interventions,	  which	  go	  from	  
routine	  check-­‐ups	  to	  third	  level	  surgeries.	  
Oportunidades	   was	   designed	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   breaking	   the	   intergenerational	   transmission	   of	  
poverty	   by	   investing	   in	   the	   human	   capital	   of	   new	   generations.	   It	   provides	   cash	   transfers	   and	   other	  
services	  needed	  to	  satisfy	  the	  minimum	  for	  food,	  health	  and	  education.	  The	  cash	  transfer	  is	  conditioned	  
on	  regular	  school	  attendance	  for	  children,	  and	  health	  clinic	  visits.	  The	  program	  was	  designed	  under	  the	  
assumption	   that	   poverty	   is	   the	   result	   of	   low	   acquisition	   of	   capabilities	   that	   translates	   into	   bad	  
functioning	  during	  adulthood,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  has	  been	  replicated	  during	  the	  past	  generations.	  
The	  program	  has	  three	  main	  components:	  
1.	  Health	  and	  nutrition	  services	  
2.	  Food	  subsidy	  in	  cash	  equivalent	  to	  35	  kilograms	  of	  tortillas	  per	  month	  
3.	  Educational	  grants	  for	  students	  under	  22	  and	  older	  than	  10	  
The	   first	   two	  refer	   to	  a	  basic	  plan	  of	  preventive	  health	  care,	  pregnancy	  care,	  nutritional	   supplements,	  
and	  bimonthly	  cash	  subsidy	  to	  avoid	  malnutrition	  in	  children.	  The	  educational	  grants	  are	  granted	  to	  each	  
member	   of	   the	   household	   under	   twenty	   one	   years	   old.	   They	   must	   be	   registered	   full-­‐time	   in	   school	  
between	  the	  third	  grade	  of	  primary	  school	  and	  the	  third	  year	  of	   intermediate	  school.	  Beneficiaries	  are	  
required	  to	  take	  preventive	  care	  and	  attend	  at	  least	  85%	  of	  classes	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  cash	  transfer,	  
which	  is	  given	  directly	  to	  the	  mother	  in	  the	  household.	  
The	   amount	   of	   money	   varies	   depending	   on	   the	   years	   of	   schooling	   and	   the	   gender	   composition	   of	  
children.	  The	  grant	  is	  higher	  for	  females	  in	  middle	  and	  high	  school.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  difference	  is	  to	  
reduce	  the	  gap	  in	  school	  attendance	  by	  gender	  given	  that	  females	  tend	  to	  leave	  their	  studies	  in	  greater	  
numbers	  and	  at	  earlier	  ages	  than	  males.	  The	  full	  description	  of	  this	  benefit	  is	  included	  in	  Table	  8.	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The	  program	  is	  targeted	  using	  both	  geographical	  targeting	  and	  proxy	  means	  tests.	  Families	  are	  chosen	  
according	  to	  methodology	  designed	  by	  the	  federal	  government.	  The	  resources	  are	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
the	  federal	  government,	  but	  the	  program	  also	  involves	  the	  local	  governments	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  health	  
and	  educational	   facilities.	   The	  historical	   affiliation	  and	   the	  geographic	  distribution	  of	   the	  affiliates	   are	  
described	  in	  Figure	  7	  and	  Figure	  8.	  	  
The	  program	   first	   covered	   the	   rural	   poor	   villages	  of	   the	   country.	  All	   households	   in	  poor	   villages	  were	  
eligible	  for	  the	  program	  (See	  Behrman	  (1999)).	  This	  made	  it	  very	  easy	  for	  state	  and	  federal	  authorities	  to	  
expand	  the	  program	  and	  facilitated	  the	  registration	  process.	  The	  large	  number	  of	  these	  type	  of	  villages	  
allowed	  authorities	  to	  design	  a	  randomized	  social	  experiment	  to	  do	  an	  impact	  evaluation.	  A	  total	  of	  506	  
localities	   in	   the	  evaluation	   sample	  were	   randomly	  divided	   into	   two	  groups:	   a	   treatment	  group	  of	   320	  
localities	   were	   covered	   in	   1998,	   and	   186	   localities	   were	   covered	   in	   2000.24	   Schultz	   (2000,	   2004),	  
Behrman,	   Sengupta	   and	   Todd	   (2005),	   Parker	   and	   Skoufias	   (2000)	   and	   Skoufias	   (2001)	   show	   that	   the	  
program	  significantly	  improved	  health	  and	  schooling	  outcomes	  and	  reduced	  child	  labor.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Originally these villages were scheduled to be covered in 2002 at the end of the rural expansion. However, the 
media coverage of the experiment forced its inclusion.  
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Figure	  6	  
Variation	  of	  Expenditure	  of	  Seguro	  Popular	  by	  State,	  2009	  
	  
Source:	  CNPSS	  (2009)	  
	  
Table	  8	  
Current	  benefits	  of	  Oportunidades	  by	  School	  Level	  




Max.	  	  Food	  +	  School	  
Per	  Household	  
Elementary	   3	   $12.00	  
$110	  
4	   $14.00	  
5	   $18.00	  
6	   $24.00	  
Secondary	   7	   $35.00	   $37.00	  
8	   $37.00	   $41.00	  
9	   $39.00	   $45.00	  
High	  School	   1	   $58.50	   $67.50	   $185	  
	   2	   $63.00	   $71.50	   	  
	   3	   $66.50	   $76.00	   	  
Source:	  Coordinacion	  Nacional	  de	  Oportunidades	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Figure	  7	  
	  Total	  dwellings	  covered	  by	  Progresa-­‐Oportunidades	  by	  year	  
	  




	  Geographical	  Coverage	  of	  Oportunidades	  in	  2009	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